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PROCEEDINGS  
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ADDRESSES  
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The American Philosophical  
Association  
1935

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# "THE TRAGIC REALM OF TRUTH"

I have been a pilgrim  
On a long quest.  
I have gone from hearth to hearth,  
Passed from breast to breast,  
Thinking to find the answer,  
Hoping for rest.

*Jamie Sexton Holme.*

I believe that many of the greatest heroes, perhaps the greatest, have been men of despair and that by despair they have accomplished their mighty works.

*Unamuno*

I have wandered endlessly  
Round the world's girth,  
Seeking ease for a mind  
Haunted from birth  
By all the torturing  
Dark things of earth.

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*Jamie Sexton Holme*

The pursuit of truth is a form of courage, and a philosopher may well love truth for its own sake, in that he is disposed to confront destiny, whatever it may be, with zest when possible, with resignation when necessary, and not seldom with amusement.

*Santayana*

I have worshipped strange gods  
Of earth, air, and sea,  
Offered many a sacrifice,  
Made many a plea,  
Only to find there is no answer,  
And no rest, for me.

*Jamie Sexton Holme*

**D**ISILLUSION matures easily as dissolution. Beyond such tragic maturation lies quiescence or re-illusion or the creation of stabler objects of fixation. Speaking histrionically, we approach

<sup>1</sup>The presidential address to the Western division of the American Philosophical Association at St. Louis, May 2, 1935.

the end of an age. Of the three grandiose ideals of Western man—Truth, Goodness, and Beauty—the modern mind has isolated and exploited Truth to the point of diminishing return. Shall it now retreat into quiescence? Re-illusion itself Greek-like with Beauty, Christian-like with Goodness? or shall it create new objects of devotion? Whatever we moderns do, we stand before the fact that the quest for truth has become for us a tragic adventure. To make this fact clear is our *prima facie*, though not our *ultima facie*, concern.

Intellectual tragedy arises from futile expectation of great things or from trivial fulfilment of great expectation. The first is, in a word, the story of the philosophic quest for truth—futility; the second, the story of the scientific quest—triviality.

# I

The frustration of expectations raised by science is the larger part of the modern tale of intellectual disillusion. It is a story not yet quite complete, but so rapidly nearing completion as to envelop us already by its shadow cast before. This new hope of mankind for truth dashed, the already recorded failure of philosophy to hold the final line of defense leaves but a rout along the whole front of the truth-sector.

Do not misunderstand the mood from which I speak. It is not for me, a callow observer, to cavil at sore-footed veterans—not along these gusty battle-fronts of contemporary heroism. Poignancy bespeaks magnanimity, and defeat calls deeply for tears. If my outlook appears sombre and my periods mount to a dirge, it is only because I bow instinctively in the presence of death and meet with whatever stateliness of style I can command the fated frustration of the modern mind in its questing for truth.

As regards science, in no sense do I belittle its spirit or forget its achievement. I am, in truth, one of its devotees. Its spirit is the form of resourcefulness and courage most characteristic of modern man; and its achievement lies all about us, ranging from comfortable conveniences to fading illusions of grandeur. I prize the conveniences more than most, but demur at the illusions—demur, however, not without a touch of nostalgia. Science has re-stirred the hunger and hope of mankind for truth. It has been



all but universally believed that it would produce a key to the mysteries of the universe, as it has offered a sure lever to turn natural energies to human ends. Alas, it cannot appease the hunger it has engendered; it cannot satisfy the hope it has raised. What science has given us becomes, indeed, as stones to the bread we expected of it. We have asked for truth; we have been given gadgets.

I do not seek to revive against science the thesis of Bergson or even of James, though I deem both men right in what they mainly affirmed. It is a humbler debit of science which I wish to remark. We as humans have asked for generality; scientists have given us specificity. When we inspect the several specificities which they give us, we find them as intellectually disappointing as they are practically fecund. Narrowing of theory to hypothesization generates things; but things are things. Not only will the scientist not piece together his several verified hypotheses into truth, but the philosopher cannot do so. Charmides is doubly answered; not only is there no science of sciences; there is not even an acceptable philosophy of sciences. The scientific synthesizers of science, like its outside popularizers, have been disdained by its real masters of inverted inferences—intent men who accept the ever narrower as the guerdon of curiosity.

The microscope symbolizes well this devotion of science to the trivial—an instrument which makes the small appear as large as the large actually is. An indefinite division of the most important will give at last the trivial; and to call the results truths only reduces truth itself to triviality. Magnify sufficiently the trivial and you have the only truth known to science. The very best that can be expected from the analytic approach to truth represented by science is (1) more and more gadgets for the comfort and convenience of mankind; (2) a precious substitute on the part of a few active research-workers of a joy in the pursuit for mankind's coveted joy in the possession of truth; and (3) a spreading to more and more sensitive men, like Unamuno, of the tragic sense of life as a result of this greatest of all failures of high human hope. The best that can be said for science in this generous context is that *it has made and will make major contributions to minor needs of the human spirit.*

This would not be as tragic as it is if the philosophers, or anybody else, could put together what the scientist rejoices to see disassembled. Some philosophers have professed to find their vocation in squatter sovereignty—the occupying and cultivating of the interstices of the several segments of science. But squatters have proverbially been frozen out, and the fate of the philosopher who would achieve truth by composing the disassembled truths of science has not been, nor is it likely to be, a happy one. The drift of science, unchecked, is clearly toward degradation—either the vulgarization of taste into mere preference for things or the pluralization of curiosity into fixation upon the indefinitely small. To retail the trivial is at last to humble truth to tragedy; and to bow curiosity to the yoke of things is the spirit's final *débâcle*.

## II

Employment in the assembly-plants of science is no fit work for the philosopher. He is a competitor of, not a conspirer with, the scientist. He lives in the house built by science, but upon meat the house-builder knows not of. As the scientist reduces great truth to little truths that do not satisfy robust expectation, so the philosopher, escaping particularization, promotes the quest for truth to the futility of an unattainable. If scientists, as microscope-men, devote themselves to making the small appear as large as the large, then philosophers, as telescope-men, devote themselves to making the unattainably remote appear as plausibly present. By going in for truth in the grand manner, Truth is restored to aspiration but lost to achievement. The fulfillment of the sacred pursuits of philosophy—God, Freedom, and Immortality—is no nearer than when Kant with finality surrendered them to hope. Nor are the grand secular pursuits any nearer to demonstration, *e.g.*, the mind-as-such, the object-in-itself, the release of the knower from the loneliness of solipsism, the common will, the harmony of individual interests in a social accord. By fastening the truth-quest to such glamorous eidola as these, philosophy has suborned itself to truth as an effulgent futility. Perhaps the best that can be said for the pure speculative enterprise is that *it has made minor contributions to major human needs*.

To make this eventuation clear, let us leave unrattled the dead bones of proof and disproof of these ancient impossibilities, sacred and secular alike; and turn to the major compensations for historic futility, compensations which themselves are philosophic fruits.

With scientific preoccupation over method has gone in modern times deep concern with theories of truth. This substitutive concern—of theories of truth, I mean, for truth itself—is open acknowledgment of the unavailability of truth. Theory of truth is the great second best for minds rebuffed by the best. But the pathos of primary devotion to futility is humbled to pity when the mind is faced with frustration over even the second best. The contemporary quest for truth has in no small measure become this game of checkmating the other fellow's theory of truth. For truth-seekers to divide hopelessly over both the definition of, and the pathway to, what is sought—this is frustration so final as to be ignominious. But apart from this ubiquitous frustration in the age-old adventure for truth, no theory can stand even the scrutiny of its friends. Having no new theory to offer, let me hand you back simply the pessimistic conclusions you and other philosophers have taught me to draw with reference to the theories that already obtain.

1. *Coherence is no adequate theory of truth.* Only an absolute point of view can make it out so, and such a point of view is not available to men. What is not available can neither test nor be tested by finite frailty. Of coherence, then, I remark simply that it is only when men know not what to trust that they trust they know not what.

2. *Correspondence is no adequate theory of truth.* One must already know what is true before he can know what beyond his ideas corresponds with his ideas. Of correspondence, then, I remark simply that it is only when men must say something that they say something which they themselves do not understand.

3. *Prediction is no adequate theory of truth.* If truth is prediction, then no idea ever is, but merely always is to be, true; for prediction cannot be what it is of without compounding confusion of substance and attribute. Such basic categories chronically confused, the inherent tragedy of truth is likely to be tinged at times

with comedy through errors of honest mis-identification. Of this theory I remark, finally, that it is only men who despair of truth who call prediction of it truth itself.

Having been thus prompted against the adequacy of each theory separately, I must now add my gravest doubt whether a federation of all the tests can give us assured truth; for the theories in part cancel one another and, more embarrassing, each theory in the joint efforts fails to be an adequate test of its own truth. How, indeed, can coherence test the coherence-theory? to what does the correspondence-theory correspond? and what solvent prediction validates the prediction-theory of truth? What, for a fact, appears the genuinely common element in all the theories, and what, I suspect, is that upon which reliance is actually placed as the only test of truth, is some vague feeling of 'satisfaction'. What James called "satisfactory working", when stated more traditionally as obviousness or self-evidence, becomes the hidden reliance, I am convinced, of all schools. Moreover, on this reliance, the schools merge quietly with common sense and unite in elevating to the supreme test of truth the oldest prejudice of man—the prejudice that what strongly feels or clearly appears so, is therefore so. "The application of the adjectives true and false", says W. E. Johnson, "coincides with the imperatives to be accepted and to be rejected, respectively." This reliance it is which sustains the faith in truth of the idealist, short of the absolute unity which is his ever unavailable official test; of the realist, short of ubiquity which is the required condition for his correspondence; of the pragmatist, short of social universality or of temporal infinity which are, jointly or alternatively, required, but vainly sought, to save his theory from solipsism.

Now regardless of what may satisfy animal faith, such natural dogmatism is not enough for a scrupulous mind. Perennially appealing, this doctrine of obviousness, or self-evidence, is pathetically inadequate as witness for truth. Too much that is true is not self-evident; too much that is accepted as self-evident turns out to be false. Indeed, to say that a judgment is *self*-evident does not even mean that it is evident to *itself*; for it is not a self but just a judgment. And surely the invocation of the formula does not make it evident to other selves. As no argument is highly

effective with an opponent when its major premise is that he is a fool, so no claim of self-evidence evidences itself to an opponent who is busily engaged in denying it. The claim, in fact, chronically arises in such situations as crucially disprove it; for surely nothing can be less evident than what is not evident even to an opponent deemed worthy to share an argument. Lifting our eyes now to a map of the world, self-evidence at Oxford is refuted by self-evidence at Cambridge; and both together, if they could get together, would as surely be refuted by, as to refute, self-evidence from Berlin. Goebbels indeed, the great logician this moment reigning in Berlin, has roundly declared: "Christ cannot possibly have been a Jew. I don't have to prove that scientifically. It is a fact."

Only certitude, then, does self-evidence guarantee; never certainty at all. And the certitude must, like advertised coffee, be dated day by day. Moreover, the *impasse* reflected, and intensified, by this claim, which is shared by common men and various philosophers as final test of all the tests of truth, adds to the tragedy of trying for truth and never reaching it the deeper tragedy of spreading the mantle of truth over every hideous error and hellish intolerance since time began. The pathos of Tantalus gives way to the sadism of Satan himself as the tragedy of seeking truth unavailingly is overtopped by the tragedy of claiming it prematurely. If piecemeal triviality of the scientific quest and wholesale futility of the philosophic quest thus unite for compensation in a pointed claim whose final concrete fruit is coercion, veritably the once hot trail of truth has grown cold and we are lost in the trackless jungle of conflicting irrationalities. Here is a logic-land where every man is king, but no one is allowed by others to wear a crown.

Truth appears, then, as some vague clairvoyance of satisfactory relationship with an environment undefined if not illimitable in its scope. Little wonder that every intellectual formulation of this clairvoyance in a disputed situation proves specious in its clarity and illusory in its certainty. Less wonder, moreover, when we remember the reach in space and time of our environment, cosmic and cultural. Our human journey is from elemental nescience through momentary prescience to ultimate nescience. The lights that flash across our little day of dim reason are lurid but lost in a sky of primeval and of eventual darkness. Historic after-images

get confused with premonitory gleams from a future rising out of the unknowable, like dawn from a night that is spent; and neither the after- nor the fore-images can clearly and surely be distinguished from the vague but indigenous glows of our own animal heats. The result is that where we simplify value to a single word like truth, we then compensate with such a multiplicity of meanings for the unitary symbol that thereafter we can never tell for certain what meaning we mean. In moments of explicitness we acknowledge this pseudo-simplicity by speaking of truths of art as well as of science, of a logic of will as well as of intellect, not to mention also a logic of events, of organic truth as well as of a truth but linear in dimension. If poor Pilate *had* stayed for his answer, he would have remained, as he has become, a man doomed to ask of any and all what he could answer as well as any—and he no answerer. Such a value in such a cosmos requires sensitivity in its search and modesty in its enunciation. "We may accept its canons", as the great dead Holmes declares in a spirit, I suspect, not unakin to that of Pilate, "even while we admit that we do not know the truth of truth."

### III

Truth lost, however, not all is lost. Nor could all ever be declared lost at St. Louis, even if everything did appear displaced; for St. Louis is the heart of the Middle West, where two magnificent waters flow together to make the Mighty Father of Waters, where was launched in 1867 *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, the first in the world devoted exclusively to pure philosophy, and where the lively *Modern Schoolman*, organ of the greatly revived Neo-Scholasticism, began its career some twelve years ago. Clearly St. Louis is no place for a philosopher to run up the white flag. I say this despite the fact that the flags flown so proudly by these two movements with St. Louis as their citadel have themselves not been without their own wide patches of white. The first—Hegelianism—flew the flag of a semi-secular Absolute, offering a criterion as unavailable as it was declared indispensable to the finite mind in its battle for truth. The second—Scholasticism—flies the flag of a sacred Absolute, assuming wholesale as faith what later is dispensed piecemeal as truth.

Since, however, we ourselves are not authoritarians, we cannot beg our greatest question by assuming as our proof of truth what needs more proof, and finds less, than does truth itself. As leading, nevertheless, to the crisis of truth we have seen each theory borrow from others and finally all of them alike borrow from some intuitive assent of common sense, so at this juncture we are to witness a curious fact. Only the deepest natural piety can bring us to declare what we witness at this crossroads: we see the bloodless category of truth escape the blood-letting of dogmatic intolerance by fusing quickly with the category of goodness. Or, dropping every semblance of metaphor, we see that assertions of self-evidence, to which all truth-claims reduce themselves in a pinch, can escape becoming instruments of torture only by being entrusted to good men. Certitude is all that intent men require to justify suppression for the sake of truth. The cowardly will assume a certitude; the intellectually unscrupulous will feign a certitude; the ignorant will stubbornly feel a certitude; the conscientious will coin a certitude out of their moral impetuosity; and all alike, though with motives diverse, will risk a battle, leaving the conscientious and the stubborn to shed their blood in the name of a cause which in pathetic retrospect appears only a case of private belief, held by the dogmatic lowly or enunciated from on high by authority equally dogmatic. The only insurance the modern world has against the recurrence of this age-old *débâcle* of persecution is the presence in it of a sufficient number of men of such character as will mollify assertions of truth with the restraints of tolerance. The primary test of such character is a humane caution in asserting self-evidence as the test of truth.

The development of civilization has meant, among other things, the disciplining of character into such caution. Only good men can and will practice such forbearance. Generosity becomes thus the savior of truth, but its salvation is conditional upon a certain categorial obscuration, the metamorphosing of truth into goodness. Unabashed assertions of truth short of agreement are suicidal to mankind. Agreements, however, upon the scale required and at the depth necessary have so far proved impossible. Something more, therefore, than motivation to truth is required to prevent the assumption of certainty short of impossible agreement upon truth.



This something more is a goodness of character which not only obscures but in the perspective of a rational career-line supplants the truth-motif. Seen in this perspective, the triviality or the futility of the quest is intensified by the narrowness of the truth-ideal itself. The realm of truth from this angle is made to appear tragic, then, not merely because its quest is largely frustrative but also because it itself occupies so small a segment of the total configuration of meaning. Its quest not only avoids suicide at the dear price of supplanting logic with ethics, but Truth itself when seen through the eyes of the magnanimous takes second place to the Good under which it is somehow subsumed. Its quest is tragic, in triviality or futility; its being is pathetic in smallness. It is this inherent pathos which, by principles homeopathic, offers some silver lining to eyes tired from scanning the skies for truth alone. The skies of ideality themselves, however, suffer no diminution by our discovering how small and even insecure a sector is occupied by truth. Beyond truth lies goodness. Let truth-seekers relieve the tragic nature of their quest by beholding this galaxy of goodness which stretches beyond but also seems to envelop the constellation of truth. Generosity of spirit is the indispensable condition for this advance; for only the generous man will mitigate his strongest convictions with mercy.

But let man beware of premature fixation upon the new galaxy of goodness if he would continue to lessen the tragedy indigenous to the life of his mind. Though the Good saves Truth, itself it cannot save; nor will the wise devotee of ideality fixate unreservedly upon the Form of the Good. As by enveloping Truth, goodness somehow obscures it, so it in turn darkens the vision of him who admiringly beholds it. When this narrowing has grown chronic it reinforces the drive for truth which threatened civilization itself through the premature substitution of certitude for certainty, and furnishes an impenetrable rationalization of righteousness for deeds steeped in infamy. Truth-fixation suffused and succored by visions of the good may easily become the moral bigotry which among all bad things modern men have rightly come to deem the worst.

Worship of the Good too easily generates as its earthly human



fruit an inversion of spirit which becomes quickly pathological. A developing love of discipline for its own sake marks the first advance of moral paralysis, and asceticism is the end-result of a love of goodness that makes of its goal a doom. The tragedy of life deepens through the discovery that what lessens the tragic element in the quest for truth but in turn often plunges the human spirit into a bigotry more rotund than the self-assertions of truth or into the anemic renunciation called asceticism. The Oliver Cromwells of life have taught us to fear the first; the Woodrow Wilsons of life to pity the last. We moderns suspect that if the path to civilization runs through conscience, it leads beyond conscience.

As, however, there appears as yet no balm that does not have its own blight, so as yet appears no disease of spirit that does not have some alleviation. Generosity saves truth from dogmatism only to reinforce dogmatism with bigotry or to debilitate it into asceticism. The fact that Goodness saves truth leaves us expectant that there may be relief from goodness before it in turn degenerates into a pathology of the spirit. If generosity keeps its wings, rather than losing them and sinking as already described, it finds itself mounting to magnanimity; and lifted on these spreading plumes it lands the soul at last on the threshold of Beauty. All dross purged by this arduous passage, the soul loses the narrowness acquired in the first realm and all impetuosity, assertive or regressive, hanging over from its sojourn in the second realm of ideal being. But if solaced she settles in this segment until accustomed to effulgence, the light grows grey through wont, luxury begets softness; and the soul begins to doubt whether there is any autonomous goodness and proudly to proclaim that there is no truth at all save beauty. Inspiration survives as intoxication, and inebriation leads to madness. The soul debilitated at last through excess of luxury, loses her plumes, though not her ecstasy at the thought of other realms of being. Beauty, the catalyser of goodness and truth, now fails her; and the soul is left only with her discontents feeding upon their own fumings. This is the direst tragedy, to have successive reliefs from previous narrownesses culminate in the *ennui* that is worse than all narrowness—sick satiety.

## IV

Such is one snapshot of the soul's career. No enlargement of this negative can ever wholly remove the tragic tint. But enhanced perspective may perhaps dilute and redistribute it into the symmetry and proportion of art—the fine art of great tragedy. Moreover, in the living of life, as distinguished from the contemplation of it, there is more than surcease from frustration: there are positive compensations for many of the wounds of pride and for not a few of the complaints of humility. As glimpses of the universal in contemplation repair knowledge of our partiality by a sense of wholeness, so pursuit through action of the utterly specific beats to fulfilment an open pathway. The overshadowing sense of the tragic which recurs from recognition that preoccupation with nothing partial will ever satisfy and that nothing so whole that it is not in turn a part will ever be ours—this darksome sense of life is made bearable either by whole-souled action or by untensioned contemplation of the universal in experience. What makes it more than bearable, may indeed even render it highly fruitful, is neither one but both—one after the other. While there is variety in both the realm of ideality and the realm of action, variety in either is not enough. But for oscillation between the two, life would become the deadest of evils.

Rendering insufficient the other, each of these poles also provides relief from that insufficiency. David Hume, who felt this more than most, left to appear, however, as largely sporadic and irresponsible the oscillation which alone can alleviate our tragic sense of life. To turn from scepticism to backgammon is not just bravado; it is the secret of the wisest philosophy of life yet discovered by man. As romantic love slows down to kindness, so renounces the modern mind the romantic quest for “an abiding satisfaction of an abiding self” in favor of a partial fulfilment of a self ambivalent as between thought and action, through oscillation dependably repeatable as long as life shall last.

This way lies relief but no cure for the tragic sense which pursues us through all realms of ideal being. Even the best-timed oscillation from ideality to action is not enough, however, to be denominated a cure. The chief reason why this is no complete

catharsis of the tragic has not yet been enunciated; nor has the particular form of oscillation which constitutes the greatest relief been as yet made explicit. The chief reason to which I refer as the final failure of optimism is this: the ideals upon which we are most prone to rely for informing our action are the higher ones. Nicolai Hartmann's axiological law has taught us that the higher the ideal, the weaker; and the lower, the stronger. That is the chilling voice of despondency which reverberates from the axiological heights of hope; for what man of aspiration wants to achieve things in the name of low ideals? Aspiration is for achievement in the name of the loftiest ideals. Take it from a politician, however, that lowly wants, only dimly conscious of the next step, are more potent social forces than are the most shining ideals encompassing all peoples and all times. The majestic regulative ideals of Truth, Goodness, and Beauty, while enriching immeasurably the private life of imagination, regulate the actual life of man in the smallest possible degree. The more they promise, the less they perform. This follows, on Hartmann's law; and is, I fear, confirmed in the experience of every man who rubs shoulders with the world. But there follows, too, a more hopeful result, made articulate by the percipient American poetess from whom I quoted initially, Jamie Sexton Holme:

The road to heaven may be strait  
And narrow, as they say;  
The little road to paradise  
Goes winding all the way.

The road to heaven runs along  
Steep hill and glaring plain;  
The little road to paradise  
Runs down a leafy lane.

The road to heaven is hard to keep,  
And very hard to find;  
The little road to paradise  
Is hard to leave behind.

They say that heaven is for the good.  
I do not greatly care;  
But sinners visit paradise—  
I know, for I was there.

## V

The redeeming oscillation, and the one most to be remarked by the pilgrim who has turned his back on heaven the more securely to keep his feet on the path to paradise, is not the dizzy swoop from pure ideality to stiff-jointed action, but rather the more radical alternation from the final tragic mood which the world as a whole produces upon the soul activated toward truth. As we survey all time and existence, we must admit that, everything considered, the world is a sombre but merry place. This alteration of mood is what I would leave with you as of final moment. We smile at Cabel's judgment that every masterpiece is a human dream badly damaged at the birth. Smile we do, but our smile is wistful and telltale—telltale of a story long as time and ambiguous as the glance of Janus.

Socrates at Agathon's Banquet enunciated the motif of that story; discerning souls have from age to age exemplified it, and now it requires only a word to revivify the proof of its ultimate principle. This principle, as voiced by Socrates, is the continuity of the tragic and comic.

Man is unlike all living things;  
Being afraid, he laughs.  
Over the bitter bowl he quaffs,  
In his despair, he sings.

The proof of this principle, if other proof be needed than the nature of man and the recurrence of thinkers who see the same world to be both tragic and comic, is this: a person who discovers comedy in the seamy career of the human soul is himself a tragic figure; and the philosopher who spreads over this goodly world a deep-tinted mantle of gloom eventually awakens in us a sense of the comic. Behold him, we say, "a little man in trousers slightly jagged".

From that final phrase of William Vaughn Moody's, I conclude with Carl Sandburg's illustration of this radical oscillation which is the secular soul's final relief from frustration and the modern mind's surest guarantee of sanity.

I was a boy when I heard three red words a thousand  
Frenchmen died in the streets for: Liberty, Equality,  
Fraternity—I asked why men die for words.

I was older; men with mustaches, sideburns, lilacs, told me  
The high golden words are: Mother, Home and Heaven—  
Other older men with face decorations said: God, Duty, Immortality—

Years ticked off their say-so on the great clocks of doom and damna-  
tion, soup and nuts; meteors flashed their say-so:  
And out of Great Russia came three dusky syllables workmen took  
guns and went out to die for: Bread, Peace, Land.

And I met a marine of the U.S.A., a leatherneck with a girl  
On his knee for a memory in ports circling the earth and he said:  
Tell me how to say three things and I always get by—gimme a  
plate of ham and eggs,—how much?—do you love me, kid?

T. V. SMITH

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

## THE QUEST FOR IGNORANCE OR THE REASONABLE LIMITS OF SKEPTICISM<sup>1</sup>

THE blackest black appears only with the whitest white in the illumination of the most brilliant sunshine. Where there is no white neither is there any black. So with skepticism. Utter skepticism—a skepticism void of all knowledge—could not know itself and stands refuted in its very utterance. A skeptic gleams in the same light as the gnostic with whom he contrasts himself. Whether velvet black or twilight gray, skepticism stands in the presence of some light which makes its darkness known.

Since we often hear that ours is a skeptical age, it seems a suitable question for us to ask, How skeptical can a man be without appearing silly? I am asking this question here. The answer which I shall try to give will be on the basis not of avowed dogma nor of indubitability nor of meaninglessness, but on the basis of a balance of reasonableness, in the broad English sense of this term, between belief and unbelief. (I cannot, of course, say 'disbelief' since this must be as assertive as belief.) It will be an amusing procedure at the least, and possibly an instructive one, to reverse the usual philosopher's quest for 'How much can we know?' and ask, 'How little can we know?'. What is the maximum of a reasonable unbelief?

I am posing the question in the context of modern society. And this, I think, is fair enough, since I am raising it in the company of you learned gentlemen, who have come together here from various social institutions of learning, which, as your salary-checks at least assure you, are considered of value by some large groups of men. On such an occasion it would be unreasonable to expect me to ignore your presence here or your connections with institutions of learning, held in high social esteem. I want to suggest, too, that this assembly is a more reasonable place to raise this question than in the confinement of a philosopher's study. Here visibly before us are the common facts of life—spoons and saucers, food, men and women with whom we talk, hopes and fears, business transacted, customs accepted, and the specific sense

<sup>1</sup>The presidential address to the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association at Stanford University, December 27, 1935.

of membership in a society. It is with you here and now in this atmosphere and among these facts that I am asking this strange question, How much can be reasonably doubted?

In trying to discover a means of answering this question, we find ourselves faced with a dilemma, which is itself the source of much unreasonable skepticism. To keep our balance, this dilemma must be frankly faced and steadily held in mind. We seem to need the instruments of knowledge even for knowing that we do not know. You remember that the *Theaetetus* ran on the rocks of this very dilemma. Says Socrates at the end: "But how foolish, when we are asking what is knowledge, that the reply should be, right opinion with knowledge of difference or of anything!" In order to know knowledge or its absence, it seems as if we must assume that something is knowledge or is a legitimate way of getting knowledge; and, after we have made our assumption, how do we know that the result is not as precarious as the assumption?

In order to seek an intelligent answer for any such question as the one we are asking, we apparently have to approach facts with certain concepts. Given the concepts the facts begin to take shape, discriminations to appear, and judgments of truth and falsity to come forth. But what is the guarantee for the concepts? It is easy to conclude that knowledge is impossible, and that complete skepticism alone is cognitively justifiable. Much as we should like, in our pursuit of the minimum of knowledge, to accept this neat and ideal conclusion, I fear it is too easy. It is based on one consideration only, that of the precariousness of using concepts not known to be valid as instruments for the attainment of knowledge intended to be valid. It ignores unfortunately the equally compelling and embarrassing consideration that something was done by the assumed concepts, that there were concepts and facts and results, impossible though this may seem. It ignores what I have just brought to your attention, that here we are with spoons and saucers before us and other members of the Pacific Philosophical Association all around us, and that, say with our lips as we will, 'These things are unknown', we nevertheless do not say so in our hearts or by our acts.

The dilemma does not lead us to utter skepticism. The most it can do is to suggest that there may be no truth (however much

ignorance is invaded by knowledge) that does not contain a tincture of falsehood.

The dilemma appears in another form in the distinction between fact and description. This distinction is, in fact (or in description, whichever), hard to make with precision, and the greater the precision in many instances the more glaring the dilemma. Nevertheless, the distinction seems to be unavoidable. The difficulty appears in the definition of fact that seems to be most generally accepted at present: that a fact is what renders a proposition true or false. But this seems an extraordinarily backhanded way of defining a fact. It is like defining a wild animal as an animal that must be kept in a cage. Facts do not seem intrinsically to involve propositions any more than wild animals involve cages. Yet it is not to be denied that when facts are brought into civilization to be studied, they have to be put into descriptive propositions, just as wild animals brought into civilization have to be put into cages.

I think Samuel Johnson's definition is better: a fact is something that can be kicked, especially if this is generalized into the form of something you cannot get away from, or something that insists upon itself. But these are after all only ways of saying that a fact is simply what is, or that a fact is a fact, which hardly seems worth saying. The difficulty in the matter is that what is a fact is precisely what knowledge is trying to discover, and that previous to the discovery we do not know what it is, while, if we knew what it is, we should not be trying to make the discovery—just the old dilemma.

But it is worth noting in this context that the knowledge we are trying to find the minimum of is not a knowledge that can be distinguished from fact. It is not the minimum of some specific sort of knowledge that we are in pursuit of—not scientific knowledge, nor physical knowledge, nor spiritual knowledge, nor knowledge of insects or ions, not knowledge as distinct from 'having', nor acquaintance, nor immediacy, nor anything else specific—it is anything at all that could be called knowledge or fact. We are not going to be particular. In the pursuit of the greatest possible reasonable skepticism we shall play fair with the gnostics and not trick them into the admission of a fake skepticism by the aid of an arbitrarily restrictive verbal definition of knowledge. On the



contrary, we will not define at all, and will accept anything whatever as knowledge or fact that can be shown to be more reasonable in the acceptance than in the rejection.

With this much by way of preliminaries, let us now try to start at the bedrock of skepticism. We learned gentlemen, as I remarked earlier, cannot say that we know nothing or that there are no facts. That would be making too great fools of ourselves. Total ignorance is out of the question. Barring utter skepticism, then, what is the next most promising minimum of fact or knowledge we can suggest?

Do some of you answer "solipsism of the present moment"? That, however, is not the right answer. Not any but very learned gentlemen could make such an answer, and it requires all their learning to give any significance to it. The ordinary student in a freshman class, who, for all our digs at his ignorance, has quite a massive knowledge and acquaintance with facts, always finds this a very silly notion. It requires the marshalling of a great many facts and principles and a careful linkage of argument with argument to lead the student to a sufficiently complex system of knowledge for him to realize what it means to say that he possesses no knowledge and that there are no facts beyond the colors and shapes and ideas and feelings of his own momentary present awareness. If we could be certain of the knowledge and facts involved in the theory of a solipsism of the present moment, our knowledge would be very great and very precise and skepticism would be a name with little meaning.

The minimum of acceptable fact and knowledge is not anything as clean-cut and clear as the doctrine of the solipsism of the present moment. It is not the mock humility of a cardinal who lays aside for a brief ceremony his robes of cloth and gold and washes with his own hands the already well washed feet of a beggar. It is the genuine humbleness of the great rabble of beggars themselves who live and do not know why they live, nor how long they will live, nor what they will live upon. But they live.

I refer to the cups and spoons on these tables, the lumps of sugar, the chairs, the pieces of perspective, the cough, the sneeze, the warmth, the sound, and, if there is sense, the sense of these words, the sense of Stanford University, and this room, in this

building, on this campus, in these United States, in the world, your breathing, your smiles, and the feelings behind your smiles—all these things for you and for me and for thousands and millions. These are the ragged facts or ragged bits of knowledge a freshman cannot escape from—nor you nor I with all our superior learning.

I call them middle-sized facts. Loewenberg calls them preanalytical data. Idealists call them fragments. They comprise much of what the pragmatists call experience. I think Plato frequently referred to them as opinion, and sometimes as the imperfect and changing. These motley beings are what stand between us learned men and total ignorance. Use our learning as we will to deny knowledge and fact, we never with our most perverse skill in logic and hypothesis can sink lower than middle-sized facts. We may turn our backs on the colored mountains, shut our eyes to the green valleys, and leap into the sea to drown ourselves, but middle-sized facts like the Great Salt Sea will not let us sink; even a philosopher comes bobbing up with smarting eyes. In our studies we follow Bradley down into his Absolute, Meyerson to his Identity, Eddington to his pointer-readings, Poincaré to his conventions—till somebody calls "Dinner!" and we bob up to the surface of this sea of facts.

Now what these facts are, the Lord knows, but try to get away from them! With every attempt we make asses of ourselves. Instead of getting below them, we generally find (as in the case of the solipsism of the present moment) that we have climbed way above them and have mistaken our altitude above for depth below.

These middle-sized facts are the matrix of all knowing. We are so immersed in them all the day long that we ordinarily miss their significance. The common man does not think about them, because he is moving among them; and the specialist does not think about them, because he has made assumptions that raise him above them. They get left out in most discussions of knowledge and fact. But they constitute the lowest limit of skepticism.

They are annoyingly yielding to the specialist in his analysis of knowledge or in his search of definite fact. Like water they let him sink into them, and, because they give way so easily, he may infer that they do not exist. His inference seems corroborated

by the circumstance that wherever he lets himself down into them they yield equally.

Take this spoon by my coffee-cup. See how you all look at it! If I ask my neighbor to hand it to me, he finds no difficulty in the act. But what is this spoon? Is it a configuration of atoms? Or is it a set of perspectives? Or is it a social convention? Or is it an aspect of the absolute? Or is it a particularization of numerous universals? Or is it an essence attached to animal faith? This spoon yields to all of these descriptions. But the yielding does not justify an inference that there is no spoon. It simply bears witness to the security of the spoon. Descriptions may come and go; this spoon keeps right on yielding to our pleasures and feeding coffee. So with all other middle-sized facts.

Another characteristic of middle-sized fact is that the distinction between fact and description, of which so much is made in cognitive analysis, does not appear here. This also is very annoying to the specialist. With some justification he objects to my even using the word 'fact' to refer to these things. Let him use any word he wants. He will find every precise word a misnomer, because precision is just what these things do not have. Precision comes from analysis and criticism, and, precisely, middle-sized facts are preanalytical and uncritical.

The next question we must ask is how far we can proceed in analysis and criticism without being subject to skeptical attack. I believe that I have shown up to this point that no sensible man can be skeptical about middle-sized fact, that is, preanalytical or uncritical fact. Now I want to ask whether there is also some analytical or critical fact or knowledge about which a sensible man cannot be skeptical.

We are moving out on to less secure ground. For the security of middle-sized fact is the result of its being so noncommittal. You cannot refute anything that does not specifically commit itself. Now analysis and criticism aim at clarity and specificity and comprehension, and consequently lay themselves open to attack in a way that middle-sized fact does not. But the material analysed and criticized is the material of middle-sized fact itself. It is this very spoon, these cups and saucers, these tables and table-cloths that are analysed and criticized. They are clothed and metamor-

phosed by criticism out of recognition of themselves as middle-sized facts, but the aim is clarity, specificity, and comprehension of knowledge. The risk is worth taking from the point of view of knowledge if there is any chance of achievement in these directions. We searchers of ignorance ourselves must admit that because of its very non-committal character, middle-sized fact itself is ready to accept clarity and specificity, if these can be justified and maintained.

Let us now turn our eyes away from the middle-sized facts of this room and consider the Universities from which we have come. The preservation and the acquisition of critical knowledge, both as fact and description, is one of the chief avowed aims of these institutions. What is this knowledge? It involves various procedures the most important of which are enumeration, classification, correlation, substitution, inference, and hypothesis. The first three—enumeration, classification, and correlation—are especially characteristic of what we call the sciences. The next two—substitution and inference—are especially characteristic of mathematics; and the last—hypothesis—is especially characteristic of philosophy. These procedures are methods by which cognitive specialists seek to obtain what they are likely to call objectivity; but by objectivity they mean, when all is said, simply something to drive the skeptic away. How far do they succeed in their aim? I think we must confess that they succeed to a considerable degree.

The success of these disciplines—science, mathematics, and philosophy—in so far as there is success in holding the skeptic off, is of a distinctly different type from that of middle-sized fact. Furthermore, each discipline has a special success of its own, and there is in addition a sort of success that comes not from any one of them singly but from all of them working together or considered together. For the separation of the procedures is, as we know from our acquaintance with our universities, mainly a matter of emphasis in the several disciplines. Science involves mathematics and philosophy, and mathematics (perhaps more than it would care to admit) involves science and philosophy, and philosophy involves the other two. Nevertheless, there is a rough separation among them, and certainly a great difference of emphasis.

Now, unless we wish to admit that a university is a great hoax,

we must be ready to assert that these disciplines in some way or other make inroads upon ignorance—inroads, moreover, beyond the uncertain boundaries of the sea of middle-sized fact. The way to picture the situation, I believe, is something like this. There is first the welter of middle-sized, uncriticized fact. Then, working over spots of uncriticized fact, critical procedures generate criticized fact or knowledge. These are of two kinds: the data of science, and the systems of mathematics. Then, gathering these together in organizations, are hypotheses, which culminate in the world-hypotheses of metaphysical philosophy. This is the panorama. Now let us examine more carefully the new landmarks and see how solid they are.

The data of science are enumerations, classifications, and correlations. The history of science is very revealing as a story of a fight against skepticism. The scientist has an obsession for data that no one in his senses could doubt. He wants stubborn facts, and he does not want to make hypotheses. The reason he does not want to make hypotheses is that if facts depend upon hypotheses, they are as precarious as the hypotheses. He wants independent facts that stand on their own feet. He wants independent data. He has tried, therefore, to cut off all irrelevancies so as to reach data that would remain data no matter what. He has especially tried to cut off all relativity to the observer. The history of experimental control and the formulation of scientific results is governed by this persistent aim. Everything else has been subordinated to that. The result is an extraordinary characteristic of scientific procedure known as 'reduction'.

The moment a scientist sets his eye on a middle-sized fact, such as this spoon, he immediately begins to think how he can reduce it to data which do not have the yielding character, which we found the spoon has as a middle-sized fact. This reduction consists of a succession of correlations and enumerations and classifications in the direction of what he has found to be the most stubborn of all data, pointer-readings. There is one conception of science that summarizes this side of the story better than any other, the theory that science is nothing but a system of correlations among pointer-readings. The theory, of course, goes still further and states that these are all the facts there are, and that

there is no other knowledge—but just here we need not go that far.

Pointer-readings are the scientific ideal of data, and the scientist's chief offering against skepticism. Why does he feel so secure with a pointer-reading? Because, in the first place, it is as far as possible removed from the biological processes of the observer's body, and, in the second place, because it can be read by the eye, which is one of the most highly discriminating senses. Furthermore, by external mechanical means such as levers and lenses, the potential discriminations of the eye can be increased many times. But in what way do these reasons militate against skepticism? By producing uniformity of results. When a middle-sized fact is reduced to pointer-readings according to specified rules of correlation, enumeration, and classification, then not only does a single observer obtain the same (or very nearly the same) readings on every occasion that he makes an observation, but so does every other human being who has eyes and can read off numbers on a scale.

This is certainly a hard fact for a skeptic to cope with. The skeptic can show that there are assumptions behind the fact—the assumption of a normal observer, of the continued stability of a scale and of the sensory apparatus of the observer, or at least a stability of relation between the two, of reliability of memory and documents, of numbering conventions, and so on. The scientist's pointer-readings are not free from assumptions. But the question is whether the assumptions a skeptic must make to break down the factuality of pointer-readings are not more unreasonable than those of the scientist who claims such factuality. There is nothing indubitable about pointer-readings in any absolute sense of indubitability. If a man will be perverse enough, of course he can doubt them. He can doubt the whole table of specific gravities, or disbelieve his very eyes. Descartes' demon is always just around the corner to help him. But the point is, it would be perverseness to doubt when so much apparatus is required for the act.

The scientist does not have to plead for his pointer-readings because they are the very ideal of facts which any reasonable person would accept. Other types of correlations, enumerations, and classifications, however, are on more precarious ground. How

many objects are on this table? You must tell me first what an object is. How many kinds of objects are there in this room? Tell me first what you mean by a kind. These facts have not the objectivity of pointer-readings. They are hardly more than middle-sized facts, if they are not actually such. They serve to show us how the facts of science, taken in a broad sense, range all the way from plain middle-sized facts to the most highly refined pointer-readings. In this range we have a scale by which to judge how scientific a science is. The more a discipline is concerned with pointer-readings or with facts approaching pointer-readings, such as statistical enumerations, the more scientific and objective it is said to be. It has its facts in such a shape that they involve a minimum of assumptions, and these of a sort that any man is likely to accept without demur, and the results obtained are uniform or nearly uniform for all normal observers.

The security of mathematical processes is of the same sort as that of scientific data, but developed along a different line. The mathematician is interested not in data but in transitions. There are, of course, transitions involved in correlations, enumerations, and classifications, and often the distinction between a scientific treatment (in the restricted sense just examined) and a mathematical treatment is unappreciable. An enumeration of objects, for instance, is both scientific and mathematical. But if emphasis in the pursuit of knowledge is laid on the objects to render these as refined and generally acceptable as possible, the end of the chase will be pointer-readings; whereas if emphasis is laid on the enumeration, the end will be certain highly refined and generally acceptable modes of transition.

What corresponds in mathematics to the pointer-readings of science is substitution and inference. All other modes of transition are as far as possible reduced to these. A proof is fully analysed when you can say how many substitutions and inferences are involved and in what sequence. And a whole mathematical system is analysed when such sequences of substitutions and inferences lead back to a set of primitive ideas and postulates; and these, if you please, may be regarded simply as marks and combinations of marks on paper. Could anything appear more obvious or free from skeptical criticism?



The earlier stages of mathematics did not represent such a complete reduction as this. The reduction is the rather recent work of logical mathematicians and mathematical logicians. Euclid's proofs seem obvious enough to most of us if we note each transition, but the proofs become still more obvious if they can be reduced to a succession of inferences from literal substitutions (free from rotations and superpositions); and inference in this context means simply that, granted the postulates and propositions from which a given proof is generated and granted the substitutions according to the rules of the system, then the desired proposition or the stage of proof reached follows from the previous propositions. Inference here is simply a summary acceptance of a succession of valid substitutions. The transitions are reduced to just two, of which one is, so to speak, a summary of the other. It makes a minimum to criticize, and this minimum of the highest obviousness to any normal man who has learned to read symbols.

Moreover, to clear the decks of all other assumptions, the mathematician who began calling his postulates axioms and attributing to them a cognitive value other than that of a combination of marks for the guidance of the substitutions and inferences of the system, has now come to call his axioms postulates. In short, he has carried the reduction of transitions to the point where the only cognitive claim he makes is that substitutions and inferences are valid according to the rules of the system.

If the system is given an application, this application is of the nature of a correlation, and the validity of the correlation must stand on its own feet. An engineer who applies a mathematical system to his field must assume responsibility himself for any lack of analogy among the relations of the elements in his field, and the relations exhibited in the mathematical system.

Now what can the skeptic do with this? Again, I think it would be unreasonable for a man to reject these systems of substitutions and inferences for the facts they claim to be—namely, systems of substitutions and inferences. There is here with substitutions and inferences, as before with pointer-readings, nothing indubitable. We often make mistakes in proofs. We even get habits of making mistakes. Perhaps our systems are filled with such habits of mistakes. There may even be something in the nature of things to



make genuine substitutions impossible, so that every substitution is an illusion and we are never following the rules we think we are. But if we have to go to such lengths to be incredulous, we might as well be credulous. It is, in a word, unreasonable to be skeptical about mathematics. So here is another great mass of refined cognitive material that stands between us and ignorance.

Incidentally, you may wonder why I first talked about enumerations, correlations, and classifications, and only afterwards of substitutions and inferences. There is a common notion that if anything is certain, mathematics is. On the contrary, if anything is certain, I suspect physics is. I turn to the man-in-the-street to corroborate me. He always feels that there is something sleight-of-hand about a mathematical proof and feels much safer with a pointer-reading. He feels safest of all, of course, with a middle-sized fact—but that is another story. I have a reason for wanting to suggest that at the very least a mathematical substitution is no more secure than a pointer-reading, and I suspect that a pointer-reading is more secure. This is why: The intellectual process required to construct or follow a mathematical proof is more complicated than that required to discriminate a pointer-reading. The latter is sheer discrimination. Animals, quite apart from man, can be trained to enumerate, correlate, and classify. They do not even need to be trained, they perform these activities naturally and some of them often with a refinement that man can rival only through the mediation of instruments. But can they make symbolic substitutions and inferences? To a very slight degree, if we can trust presentday observations, a degree that can scarcely be separated from somewhat complicated acts of correlation and classification. Mathematics, I believe, is a language-process, only possible in animals that have acquired a high degree of cultural advancement. It presupposes this whole social organization. Socrates, you remember, did not demonstrate his geometrical proposition to the slave-boy by a succession of substitutions, but by what was practically a physical process of correlating areas drawn in the sand. If you want people to appreciate the obviousness of substitution and inference, you must train them to the convention of letting things take each other's places even if they do not look at all alike, and of doing this according to a variety of abstract rules. The

obviousness, in other words, is limited to the people who have the cultural development to appreciate it. That does mean most everybody, but probably not quite as many people as those who can appreciate the obviousness of a correlation, even when this takes the most highly refined form of a pointer-reading.

Well what of it? I will tell you frankly, I am introducing a wedge. For I want to suggest that if it is not something in the nature of a majority-vote that keeps the skeptic at bay, that if culture also counts, it is possible that culture in and of itself may act as a support of fact and constitute another inroad upon the territory of ignorance. An hypothesis is an island of culture, however small. It too has a degree of factuality and knowledge. This can be brought out perhaps by going as far from fact as possible, to myths, fairy-tales, or the stories of Baron Munchausen. If these were all we had in the world, it could not be said that there was only blank ignorance in the world. For one thing, these are facts in their own right, and as we hear them we live through those facts; but for another they gather together and systematize, however fancifully, many other facts. And the mode of systematization itself does not come out of nowhere. It is itself a way in which the world acts.

When, however, we turn to hypotheses properly speaking, that is, to systematizations of fact intended to be true and in some sense verifiable, then we push far into the territory of ignorance. How far?

Here it becomes for the first time important to distinguish between immediacy and description. A pointer-reading is a fact of immediacy. A symbolic report of it no doubt is a description. But it is interesting to notice that we rarely, if ever, get a report of one reading. I am not sure that I can imagine how it could be done. Suppose I say, "Pointer at 76". That is the report of the observation, and is the nearest thing I can imagine to a description of the immediate fact. But even here a whole number-system is involved, and an ambiguous reference to a system of experimental technique. Actually the simplest adequate description of the observation I am referring to would be: "In room X of building Y, Stanford University Campus, at 8:43 P.M., Dec. 27, 1935, temperature is 76 degrees Fahrenheit." Here is a systematic organization

in symbolic terms of many correlations, classifications, and enumerations. By convention, we know that it was the temperature-reading that initiated the report, and that the other correlations, classifications, enumerations, and readings were collected to give this reading a significant setting. And the point I am making is that this simplest significant description of a simple fact is of the nature of an hypothesis and not of the nature of an immediate fact. In making such a description we have passed far beyond the obvious immediate facts of observation of which we were earlier speaking, and have ventured a systematic, descriptive organization of these, which purports to be true but may actually be false by any of many hundreds of slips in the correlations, etc., involved. The watch may be wrong, the thermometer may be defective, the calendar may be not of the standard sort, this may not be room X, or building Y. I say nothing of possible errors of standardization, nor of possible errors of observation. We should also note that there is an implied quantitative criterion of cognitive value in the description. The temperature probably was not precisely 76 degrees Fahrenheit. It was possibly 76.1009 degrees, or something like that. And the time probably was not precisely 8:43 P.M., nor was it accurate to say that the temperature of the whole room was whatever that one reading was. We might even find that it was not room X but room Z in which the reading was taken. These discoveries do not totally invalidate the description. Whether we say that the description is false, but contained elements that are true, or say that it is an approximation of the truth, or say that it has a degree of truth, does not make much difference. Whatever we say, we recognize a quantitative criterion of cognitive value of some sort.

Suppose, now, we turn our attention upon this quantitative criterion. There appear to be two opposite conceptions of a good hypothesis. One is that it should stick to the facts; the other that it should provide for all possible contingencies. There is no theoretical contradiction between the two, and the ideal hypothesis can be readily described as one which both sticks to the facts and provides for all contingencies. This ideal, however, is purely theoretic, so far as we can see, and in practice men tend to take sides for one or the other of the opposite criteria. There are the

conservatives and the liberals in cognition, with all the emotional paradoxes these attitudes involve. Thus the conservatives to conserve their stability sometimes support theses more radical than the liberals; and the liberals to preserve their freedom of thought support doctrines more conservative than the conservatives.

A cognitive conservative would like to restrict the material of his hypotheses to recorded correlations, enumerations, and classifications. When gaps appear between systems of these, he would like to risk nothing in the way of a cognitive hypothesis. In practice, he is never able to keep within these restrictions, because he is constantly having to deal with facts not yet recorded. He is likely, therefore, to take recourse in a doctrine of classes, in similarity, or in some principle of uniformity in nature. And by means of such assumptions, he is likely to develop a doctrine of fact, which he believes is impregnable and free from assumptions. When he does this he ventures at least as far as the most radical cognitive liberals.

A cognitive liberal makes no restrictions upon the material of his hypotheses, so long as these are selfconsistent and dip down often enough into fact. If his hypotheses tie in from time to time with observations, he feels that there is some cognitive value in the bridge-work between the observations. The greater the systematic organization he achieves, the greater his cognitive faith in the hypotheses. This faith reaches its height in world-hypotheses, which purport to interpret any presented fact in the light of the total hypothesis, in which no facts are left out, nor any inconsistencies appear. But since this extreme faith is never realized (for inconsistencies arise in even the most adequate world-theories, and several world-theories seem to be about equally adequate) a cognitive liberal is likely to develop a doctrine of malleability of fact and conventionality of hypothesis which is more conservative than a conservative would feel comfortable in holding.

So hypotheses spread all the way from extended systems of correlations to speculative world-systems. How far can these be said to constitute knowledge? Hypotheses of correlation get most of their reliability from their materials.

What about speculative hypotheses? Here an interesting point arises, and to show it up in the clearest light let us consider only

metaphysical world-hypotheses. A metaphysical theory can be understood only if its categories are grasped. By these I mean its ways of perceiving or dividing up facts. Anyone who grasps a set of categories, by that act immediately and inevitably perceives the facts and accepts them in the manner of the hypotheses. He will not only agree with others holding that hypothesis in regard to the interpretation of the facts, but to a large extent he will agree about further inferences to be made from them, and still more as to the proper grounds for making inferences. In other words, within the group accepting the hypothesis, there will be objectivity of as high an order as that appertaining to pointer-readings or substitutions—but the group may be small.

In short, the objectivity of a world-hypothesis depends not upon extent of agreement among individuals but upon extent of fact consistently interpreted. For this sort of objectivity one man alone may theoretically be a sufficient judge. The hypothesis may be as esoteric as you please; that will have no effect upon its objectivity. In practice, however, a world-hypothesis would not be given any credence unless a number of competent men agreed on its adequacy; so that the objectivity of a world-hypothesis is tinged with that of data, just as the objectivity of data is tinged with that of hypothesis. The two sorts of objectivity, however, are theoretically at polar opposites from each other, and the opposition accounts for a great deal of cognitive controversy.

Now, the question is, How skeptical can we reasonably be about world-hypotheses? For one thing, they are not indubitable. I do not think we need argue that point. For the opposite thing, however, neither can they be utterly ignored. It is a matter of no small cognitive interest that great masses of facts can be organized so that they fit together. And to be cognitively interested in the organization and not allow cognitive value to the mode of organization is surely unreasonable. And since the mode of organization is often such as to be far from the common modes of thought, it would be unreasonable to expect many people to understand and therefore agree upon it.

There is no knock-down argument to compel people to accept the objectivity of farreaching hypotheses. But it must be remembered that neither is there any knock-down argument to compel them to accept the objectivity of data. Ten thousand men may read

the thermometer as 76 degrees. It would be unreasonable for me to doubt their observations. But I am still free to believe that a ten-thousand and first man might read it as 77 degrees and be right and all the others wrong. The weight behind factual observation is mass of agreement of observation. The weight behind the adequacy of hypothesis is the mass of agreement of fact with fact. I do not see how any man can reasonably reject the cognitive weight of either of these conditions.

Actually, every man, whatever his bias, employs some of the weight of each to back up the other. Unless the fact observed by ten thousand men can be tied in with other observed facts, we do not feel very secure in that fact; think of the hundreds of thousands of people who have seen ghosts. And unless an hypothesis accepts the generally agreed upon observations, we do not feel very secure in that hypothesis. So the two kinds of objectivity in practice call for each other and coöperate with each other. It would be unreasonable to ignore this coöperation.

How skeptical, then, all these points considered, can a reasonable man be? Not beyond, I think, a gray skepticism. He must admit that there is a lot of cognitive value in common sense, and a whole lot of cognitive value in the libraries and laboratories of our universities and in the minds of the men who keep these libraries and laboratories cognitively alive. But precisely where that cognitive value lies in this great mass of knowledge and half-knowledge, no reasonable man would care to assert except as a shrewd guess.

A black skeptic is just that unreasonable man who insists on knowing now precisely what is and what is not fact or knowledge. Perhaps he puts his faith in some fact or hypothesis and speculates upon it in the form of indubitability, inconceivability, self-evidence, necessity, certainty, forms of intuition, unqualified immediacy, the *a priori*, the stubborn fact, or tautology; and then finding that his fact or hypothesis would not support the value he set upon it, he falls into a depression as excessively deep as his valuation was excessively high. I think Hume and Santayana are skeptics very much of this order.

Or the black skeptic may be a man who puts all his faith in some single hypothesis or some particular kind of facts, supporting it as his brother above by indubitability, inconceivability, etc.,

and is then driven to disbelieve in facts and hypotheses not harmonious with his own. Such a skeptic is Bradley or any dogmatic positivist.

Most black skeptics are in different proportions both kinds together. But it is instructive to note that the black skeptic acquires his blackness from the high and melodramatic illumination in which he places the knowledge for which he declares himself. It is because the knowledge he finds leads him to expect so much, that he is so deeply disappointed; or because he believes so strongly in the knowledge he has that he disbelieves other knowledge. In a way, the blacker the skepticism the greater our assurance of knowledge—but not of that skeptic's knowledge. Moreover, the black skeptic overplays his part and is an embarrassing ally to us who are seriously in the pursuit of ignorance. For instead of unbelief he gives us disbelief, which is just as strongly belief as belief. To deny is as dogmatic as to assert, if the grounds are insufficient. And dogmatism is always unreasonable.

Gray skepticism, I believe, admits as much ignorance as a reasonable skeptic can accept. In this mild light we behold a sea of middle-sized, uncriticized facts, out of which criticized facts generate in the forms of correlations, enumerations, classifications, substitutions, and inferences. These criticized facts gather together into the two groups, science and mathematics; and, within these, working hypotheses and systems of postulates develop and multiply and spread. And then we see growing out of all of this and folding back to cover all facts and all knowledge, world-hypotheses, of which there are several. Such security as we have in the objectivity of these sights lies in the coöperation of two sorts of agreement—that of men with men and that of facts with facts. We perceive no certainty anywhere; but, as human beings endowed with curiosity and a drive to overcome obstacles and solve problems, many of us carry the hope that the clouds about us will gradually grow brighter or perhaps someday lift and reveal a sun whose brilliance if we could look directly upon it would no doubt blind our vision—and so grant the prayer of the most ardent skeptic. If this sounds more like the quest for knowledge than the quest for ignorance, perhaps that is because there is no difference between the two, provided both are reasonable.

STEPHEN C. PEPPER



## THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM<sup>1</sup>

ON an occasion like the present it would seem appropriate to choose, as the subject of our common contemplation, a theme general in its nature, fundamental in its relations, crucial in its bearings, decisive for the settling of many a smaller uncertainty, revered from the traditions of the past and from the touch of many an august thinker, fresh, strong, and young—still the root of contemporary and perennial discussion—unescapable in its incisive importance, a problem which no philosopher can permanently elude, a question which, if we do not ask it, will ask itself. There are not many such subjects, but there are a few; and I make no apology in asking your attention this evening to one of the most familiar, yet most crucial of these themes—the problem of the relation between the mental and the physical. I make no apology because, though the theme be threadbare, it is today—as it has always been— a problem of supreme and decisive importance. Several of our contemporary schools of psychology—including Behaviorism, Gestalt, Psychoanalysis—are committed to attitudes toward it so definite that with the fate of their solutions go all their fortunes. The problem is crucial for ethics and for the interpretation of history, as well as for every rational hope of bettering individual and social life. Though protest against its further consideration is in our day louder than ever before, there has never been a time when so much was written in the attempt to solve it or when those who consider this discussion an absurd waste of energy spent so much of their time in trying to prove that no one should spend any time upon it.

The development of this problem in men's thoughts is familiar to you all. It began long before our oldest written philosophy, and seems, in fact, to have been one of the very first themes of man's theoretical activity; and it has retained its central position in human thought down to this very evening. For many millenniums man's ideas about it were vague; but in course of time three well defined dualistic proposals were worked out which between

<sup>1</sup>The presidential address to the Eastern division of the American Philosophical Association at Baltimore, December 30, 1935.



them exhaust the possibilities of solution, namely, Interaction, Materialism, and Parallelism. I do not fear that anyone will quarrel with my statement that no other solution of a general nature has been, or will be, proposed; for by the word solution I am presupposing that the relation of mind and body is a real problem, and the admission of this is, of course, the admission of some sort of dualism. A view so monistic as to deny any kind of dualism between the mental and the physical would be an attempt to avoid rather than to solve the problem. Of attempts of this monistic sort I shall have something to say later on; here let me repeat that the proposed *solutions* of the problem are the three I have named.

Of these by far the oldest is Interaction. It is the natural solution, the naïve solution, if you will, and it was this that presented itself to primitive man, as well as to Socrates and Plato. It has the advantage of being obvious, but it involves two difficulties. The first of these appeared much more important before the days of David Hume than it has since. In those somewhat naïve times it was thought we knew so well what causation is and just how it works that we could be sure, prior to investigation, that two things so unlike as the psychical and the physical could not affect each other. Since Hume's time we have become wiser and humbler; and the ancient causal objection to Interaction has ceased in our day to be impressive. But the other objection to Interaction has, since the time of Galileo, steadily gained—I will not say logical force, but—prestige. This second difficulty of Interaction is the fact that it is incompatible with a complete carrying out of the naturalistic philosophy. There can be no doubt that the popular weight of this objection is in our days very great. Its logical importance can best be weighed by a consideration of the two rival theories of the mind-body relation, both of which were devised with the specific purpose of fitting mind into a naturalistic scheme of reality.

Though much younger than Interaction, Materialism is a very ancient doctrine. In our Western culture it goes back probably to Leucippus, and in India to the Carvakas, who antedated the Buddha. Under Hobbes, Lamettrie, and Holbach, it received a new lease of life which it enjoyed to the latter part of the Nineteenth

Century, when Parallelism, deriving from Spinoza, attracted many of the keener naturalists, some of whom wished to say just about what the materialists had said, but found in the Spinozistic formula a less blatant and more gentlemanly way of saying it; some of whom were unwilling to commit themselves to the formula because they saw so clearly its inherent difficulties.

What these difficulties are I need only remind this audience. The materialistic doctrine always was, and still is, ambiguous; or it might be more exact to say that there are two different and mutually conflicting hypotheses as to the mind-body problem both of which go under the name Materialism. One of these doctrines in a sense denies the problem by denying the dualism on which it rests, and asserting the absolute identity of consciousness and its bodily correlate. The other doctrine recognizes the difference between the two but asserts that all mental content and activity is completely determined by bodily conditions and processes and in its turn never determines or influences anything. The first of these formulations of Materialism—the identification of psychical with physical events—is completely armed against every attack, and can never be refuted. Not, however, because it is so obviously true but because it is so obviously false. It is impossible to do anything with a man who does not see that by the molecular activity of a group of brain-cells we *mean* something different from what we mean by the sensation of red or the idea of God. The man who does not see that must be left to the uncovenanted mercies of a kind Providence. To aver that my thought of the mind-body problem is a certain nerve-process going on in my frontal lobe, or (as Paulsen humorously suggests) that the passion of love is “a righthanded spiral motion of the molecules of the brain”—to assert such things as these is merely to make noises in the air. We know what we mean by the experience of thought or of emotion, and we know what we mean by physical processes going on in the nerve-substance of the brain, and if we know anything at all we know that we mean different things by these two expressions. To object that in our ignorance of what goes on in the brain, it is possible that a nerve-process may turn out to be a thought, or *vice versa*, is completely to misunderstand the argument. Our denial of the identity of these things is not based on

the vagueness of our knowledge but on the clarity of our meanings. If we know so little what we mean by a 'nerve-process' that it may turn out, for aught we can see, to be an emotion or a toothache, we have no business to use the term 'nerve-process' at all. A word to have a meaning must have a meaning of at least some definiteness; and just to the extent that 'nerve-process' means anything it certainly does not mean conscious thought or emotion. Surely this much should be plain in a kindergarten.

The second (and until recently more popular) form of Materialism recognizes plainly that consciousness is not brain or brain-activity, but, as I have said, maintains that it is always caused by the brain, entirely determined in its nature by the brain, and in its turn never determines or influences anything, whether bodily activity or further mental content. This view is meaningful and involves no self-contradiction. It can, therefore, presumably never be completely refuted. The central and essential part of it, however—the complete denial of all efficiency to consciousness—is so extraordinary and tremendous an assertion as to be, for most minds, very nearly incredible unless backed up by weighty reasons of either an *a priori* or an empirical nature. To suppose that never, in the history of the human race, has an emotion or an idea or a conscious purpose or impulse had any influence upon any one's actions or speech or writing or further thought, is about the most astonishing assertion that one can conceive of outside of the logically contradictory. Upon such an hypothesis no explanation (unless it be divine creation and interference!) can be given for the origin and development of consciousness; for if consciousness be entirely inefficient it is entirely useless and contributes nothing to the biological advantage of those individuals and species who happen to possess it. If thoughts are connected with each other only indirectly through the processes of matter and physical energy, it is difficult to see how there can be such a thing as logical necessity, or even the establishment of reasonable probability. We should thus be compelled to think as we do, not because one hypothesis is a more reasonable conclusion from the facts and premises than another, but because the physical laws that hold in the nervous system produce *this* hypothesis and not *that*. If this is the case it would seem to be impossible to show that Ma-

terialism is more reasonable or probable than Interaction or Parallelism; those who believe it, do so not because it is a rational conclusion from the facts, but because the physical laws grind out this particular consequence in their brains, just as they bring about the fall of the avalanche and the spray of the waterfall. Materialism would therefore seem to be one of those theories which are necessarily suicidal. And if, momentarily forgetting that reasoning is ruled out, we ask for the reasons or the evidence upon which this incredible theory rests, we are presented with no *a priori* considerations, but with facts that are quite as compatible with each of the rival theories as they are with Materialism.

It was considerations such as these that brought about, in the concluding decade of the last century, a rather lively exodus from the ranks of Materialism. Many of those who left it accepted in its place Parallelism—a doctrine which preserves to Naturalism most of what it desires, yet seems to do justice to all the proper claims of mind. Parallelism in its simple form, however, satisfied no one, and, so far as I am aware, has never been seriously held. There is no use trying to persuade anyone—even oneself—that sensations, will acts, emotions, meanings, reasonings, and the rest, run along absolutely parallel to certain definite conformations of brain-activity, with never-broken concomitance, and that all this happens without any explanation. Such an extraordinary and infinite series of inexplicable coincidences is too much for even the most enthusiastic soul to take seriously. Hence parallelists have properly searched about for a possible explanation which should be loyal to the fundamental principle that there is no direct influence of either series upon the other, and yet should enable us to understand why the two always run absolutely parallel. Two such explanatory hypotheses have been devised. One of them suggests that mind and body are merely two aspects of a *Tertium Quid*, a *Something-I-Know-Not-What*: about which, in fact, nothing can be known save that it is neither physical nor mental. This monstrous hypothesis is so obviously no genuine hypothesis at all that it has few upholders today and we need spend no time over it.

The other hypothesis sometimes used by the parallelist is a

combination of Parallelism with Panpsychism. The familiar suggestion that the inner nature of each material object may be a psychic center, and its physical qualities merely its appearance, that is, its effects upon the minds of observers, is applied specifically to the human body. Each part of it is said to be the appearance of an inner psychic center. This general doctrine gets application to the mind-body problem through the interpretation given to the personal consciousness. The inner psychic center of each part of the body save one (it is asserted) is no more directly known to us than is the center of any external physical object; but the psychic center of the cerebral cortex is the personal consciousness. Or, to put it from the other point of view, the appearance of the personal consciousness is the cerebral cortex.

Thus a peculiar and most ingenious type of Parallelism is proposed. The psychic events of my mind are not, strictly speaking, parallel to the physical events of my brain; but (apparently through some sort of telepathy) they cause psychical events in your mind, or they *might* cause psychical events in your mind; and these actual or possible psychical events in your mind are of course your actual or potential percepts of my brain. And since the *esse* of all physical objects is *percipi*, these percepts of yours are what is known as my cerebral cortex. As a fact, of course—since I do not wear my brains upon my sleeve—no psychical events of the sort are ordinarily produced. Inasmuch, moreover, as my skull has never been trepanned, strictly speaking I have no actual brain and never have had one. I get on very well without one, however, since I am a psychic center, and since my brain, if I had one, would be as inefficient and useless as on the materialistic doctrine my mind would be. Normal men and women never have brains at all, though a few attain them after they are dead, if post-mortem examinations are held. But though the brain is non-existent in nearly all cases, and quite inactive and inefficient when it does exist, this purely potential, inefficient, non-existent brain absolutely runs and dominates the mind and the behavior of all the lower centers of the body.

Some may think this improbable. Fortunately there is a simple and final laboratory-test to which the supporters of the theory may appeal for its vindication. Since the cerebral cortex is, ac-

cording to the hypothesis we are now considering, the appearance of the personal consciousness, it is plain that it would wholly vanish if the personal consciousness should cease to exist. Now there is a situation in which everyone, I suppose, is agreed that the personal consciousness either ceases to exist or at any rate loses all connection with the brain: I refer, of course, to death. The parallelist theory may therefore be definitely tested by trepanning the skull of the dead man and looking for the cerebral cortex. Oddly enough, we shall find that it has not disappeared. Odd, I say, on the basis of Parallelism; for almost the only time when the cortex actually does come into existence (as an appearance in an observer's mind) is the one time when, according to the theory, it should have ceased to be even a potentiality.

For reasons such as these, I gather, the supporters of Naturalism have, during recent years, felt considerably disillusioned over the claims of Parallelism. A few writers of psychology textbooks still pay lip-service to it in their Introductions. But this is done with no enthusiasm and no thoroughness, and it is usually plain that the reference to Parallelism is made chiefly as an easy device for avoiding a difficult philosophical subject which the author, who is not interested in philosophy, would rather not discuss. A large number of psychologists have no theory on the relation of mind and body; have seemingly never been troubled by the fundamentals of the problems; and, with the delightful naïveté of a mind quite innocent of philosophy, make use, on successive pages, of mutually incompatible theories drawn, as the occasion prompts, from Interaction and from both forms of Materialism. For this happy class of psychologists Parallelism is far too self-conscious a theory. The earnest defenders of Naturalism today, instead of being parallelists, as most of their predecessors were, seek a way out of the difficulties of the mind-body problem either by denying that there is any problem to get out of, or by returning to one of the materialistic solutions which a generation ago seemed moribund.

The first group of thinkers just referred to insist that there is not and there never has been any real problem concerning the relation of mind and body to worry over; it was always a merely spurious problem, and the difficulties it tried to solve

were all of our own making. Prominent among those who take this view are some of the objective idealists, who seem to hold that epistemology can effectively destroy dualism and thereby the fundamental presupposition of the psycho-physical problem. Such a position seems to me so astonishing that I must believe it to be based upon an entire misconception of what the mind-body problem is. First of all, therefore, let us see what the problem is *not*. It is not the purely epistemological problem of the relation of consciousness to matter, or of subject to object. It may be true, as some idealists insist, that there is no object without a subject, or it may not be true. But the question of its truth is not the mind-body problem. It may be that *esse est percipi* or that *esse est cogitari* and it may not; but this question is not the mind-body problem. The problem is this: What is the relation between stimulus and sensation; or between brain-activity and consciousness? And also, What is the relation between my conscious will to act and the (physical) action of my body? It is probably the fault of Spinoza that so many of our idealists have failed to grasp the simple question here at issue: for he badly confused the external object of one's thought with the bodily concomitant of thinking, and his influence has been as widespread as it has been unfortunate. Once it is really brought home to idealists as well as realists that the mind-body problem is not concerned with cognition and its object, but with the non-cognitive relation between a psychical existent and a physical existent, it should at last be recognized even by them that, no matter how uninteresting the problem may be, it is at least real and natural. Under some interpretation or other, I suppose, even speculative idealists will admit that Shakespeare had, or may have had, a brain. Also that in some sense he had thoughts (or thought thoughts, or was thoughts). If so, it is difficult to see how anyone can seriously maintain that the question of the relation of his thoughts to his brain is purely arbitrary and artificial.

One of the most recent and one of the ablest attempts to avoid the mind-body problem by means of an idealistic epistemology is that of Robert Blanché in his work *La notion de fait psychique* (Paris 1935). In a large part of his argument he seems to make the same mistake concerning the nature of the psycho-physical



problem that characterizes most of his school, *viz.*, the substitution of the relation between subject and object, or thought and the physical world in general, for the relation between particular experiences and particular activities of the body or of the cerebrum. He remedies this, however, before finishing his discussion, and tries seriously to face the problem, though his epistemology leads him to state it in a rather peculiar form. Dualism, having been banned from the mind-body relation, breaks out again within the body itself. For, as Blanché recognizes, my body is, on the one hand, a physical object among other physical objects, and it is also a unique link between my thought and the physical world; it is peculiarly my own; in a sense it is even myself. It is absolutely determined by the laws and events of the physical world; at the same time it "submits to the direct influence of the mental" (53). The contrast between these two aspects is so great that it is almost as though I had two different bodies; and indeed it would seem that I must have, so mutually contradictory are the aspects. Here is a new and fundamental dualism, which Blanché recognizes as real and unavoidable. What then is the relation between these two aspects of my body—or between these two bodies of mine? Blanché has no suggestion to make. "We shall not hide the fact", he writes in conclusion, "that the conception of the individual body to which our analysis has led is purely negative, and that, far from solving for us the difficulty we face, it leads us into a fundamental obscurity" (339). The outcome of the book is thus, in fact, a recognition of the reality of the mind-body problem, verbally restated, but accompanied by no suggestion for its solution. The author has merely put his question in such a way as to show that it is still a burning question, and at the same time to make all answering of it hopeless. A situation which surely will suggest to some of his readers that his difficulty is of his own making, and that there must be something questionable with an epistemology which necessarily issues in so utterly skeptical a conclusion.

The objective idealists are not alone in their attempt to avoid the psycho-physical problem by epistemological considerations. If time permitted I should at this point deal with the positions of Professor Dewey and Professor Woodbridge; but time does not



permit. I can only say in passing that Professor Woodbridge's view of mind does not, in my opinion, enable one really to avoid, but only to evade, the mind-body problem; and that Professor Dewey's position is a quite unstable mixture of Naturalism and Interaction. One of the most recent schools of Realism—commonly known as Objective Relativism—also seeks to avoid the problem, though, of course, by different methods. Like the objective idealists, this school points out that the problem in question presupposes a dualism between the bodily and the mental; and it believes this dualism can be avoided by asserting that whatever has physical qualities is physical. Since it adds to this the further assertion that every content of consciousness has physical qualities, the conclusion is reached that everything is physical, and hence there can be no question of a relation between the physical and something else. Two observations upon this very easy method of solving an agelong problem by the mere use of an old word should be made. The first is this: that the renaming of percepts, judgments, emotions, and the rest, does not destroy nor change them nor do anything to throw light on the question how, under their new name, these 'physical' objects are related to the physical objects known as conditions and events in the nervous system. The other needed observation is this: that the basal and decisive reason for rejecting Subjective Idealism (and I understand the objective relativists would reject it) is to be found in the fact that human perception and experience need to be explained; and that, if we cannot feel a lively faith in Berkeley's very busy God or Royce's Absolute, the hypothesis of existent physical objects which affect our sensibility is the simplest form of explanation. It must be noted, therefore, that the important thing about physical objects for the realist is, not that they possess 'physical qualities', but that they stand in causal relations to our experience. Once this important point is understood, it becomes impossible to equate the illusory rats of the generous imbiber with the real rats that actually gnaw holes and that have a place in the common space-time, on the simple ground that both kinds of rats have physical qualities. Whether you *call* psychical states psychical or physical, they differ in certain very important respects from what are commonly known as physical objects, and the relation between

these two kinds of 'physical' objects remains a very real question.

Nor can I feel that Logical Positivism—whether in Austria or in America—has been any more successful in its attempt to avoid this ancient problem. The method which it uses, as I understand it, is in general as follows. It starts with a pragmatic doctrine of meaning and maintains that only those propositions are meaningful which conceivably might be verified. Now since the subjective experiences of other minds, in the very nature of the case, could under no conceivable conditions be experienced by me, the assertion of their existence must be for me essentially meaningless. Or, to put it in another way, only that is meaningful which can be verified intrasubjectively. The minds of other people could never be my experience, nor could the purely subjective ever become a part of public or intrasubjective and scientific knowledge. Hence it means nothing to call them real. Human bodies, however, and their behavior can be observed and their existence verified by every human observer. It follows, therefore, that all we can ever mean by the mind of another is his body and its behavior. As Carnap has most succinctly worded it: "*Es gibt kein Fremdpsychisches ohne Leib.*" In this manner the dualism of mind and body is avoided, behaviorism is justified, and the need of solving the mind-body problem evaded.

There are several elements in this train of thought that seem to me exceedingly questionable. In the first place, the failure of Logical Positivism to distinguish meaning from knowledge is fundamentally misleading. It is certainly true that all scientific facts must be verifiable and that no assertion deserves the name knowledge unless it is in some sense demonstrable. But I can conceive of no reason for supposing that a belief or proposition must be capable of verification in order to have *meaning*. If all the terms of a proposition can find their cash value in my own experience, they still have meaning when I extend them by imagination to the experience of others; for *otherness* itself finds its cash value within my own experience. To assert that unverifiable propositions are meaningless, in fact, flies in the face of what we all know. As Professor Lewis pointed out most persuasively in his Presidential Address of two years ago, "it is entirely meaningful to think of those inventions which no one has ever thought

of or those numbers which no one will ever count; we can even frame the concept of those concepts which no one will ever frame." Indeed the very assertion of Logical Positivism we are discussing—namely that it is meaningless to assert the existence of other peoples' subjective experiences—refutes itself, because we know what it means and what its terms mean. Unless the term "other peoples' subjective experiences" meant something to us, the arguments of Logical Positivism concerning them would lose their point. Nobody really doubts that we know what we are talking about when we are discussing this question.

To attempt to defend a behavioristic view of mind and thus to avoid the mind-body problem because of the alleged lack of meaning in the concept of other peoples' minds is therefore quite out of the question. We may be behaviorists, but we cannot be behaviorists on the grounds provided by Logical Positivism.

If, moreover, the idea of other peoples' qualia be meaningless, intrasubjective data become meaningless and for the same reason—they cannot be verified by me nor by anyone. All thought about them becomes "a life-long soliloquy". With the disappearance of common data goes also all possibility of science. Nor will it help matters to distinguish between direct acquaintance with other men's subjective qualia and the relational knowledge of their form, structure, and sequence. For if the existence of these qualia be meaningless, there can be no talk of their form, structure, or sequence. The identity of physiological processes with subjective states, observed by introspection, is sometimes maintained by this school on the basis of their isomorphism: our observation of another's nervous system may someday, it is hoped, enable us to tell what his thoughts and dreams and images and emotions are. But the very hope thus expressed, the very isomorphism pointed out, is a recognition of the other man's subjective qualia and of the dualism in words denied. In brief, we are faced with the following dilemma: either the reality of subjective qualia within the experience of other people is admitted or it is not. If it be admitted we have dualism and must recognize the mind-body problem. If the subjective experience of others be denied on the basis of Logical Positivism we have Solipsism.

Professor Boring's related, though notably different, view of

the question at issue is in no danger of turning into Solipsism. It is in fact doubtful whether he should be named in this connection as one who would seek to avoid or solve the mind-body problem; his interest being in the thesis that *psychology* need not bother with it, since the things that scientific psychology is interested in are conceptual constructs only. What the dualist means by the subjective seems to be readily admitted; but this purely subjective experience, in the nature of the case, cannot be shared and verified and hence is not a scientific object. The experience which the psychologist is interested in is derived from this "actual experience", but in itself it is mediate and indirect, and consists of what the psychologist *knows about* "actual experience". The relation between the logical constructs of psychology and those of physics and physiology is, therefore, not a relation between two different kinds of things. In line with this general point of view, and as a result of certain conclusions about introspection, Professor Boring considers "consciousness" as consisting of relations between events in the nervous system, *not* as the "actual experience" which the individual lives through but cannot know in a scientific sense. One might dissent from Professor Boring's use of terms, but such a disagreement would be only verbal. One might defend a different view of introspection; one might even suggest that the more 'scientific' psychology becomes, the less recognizable are its descriptions of human nature and the less significant its conclusions. All this, however, is irrelevant to the questions with which we are here concerned. But if we have been right in our interpretation of Professor Boring's position, it should be clear that he has done nothing to solve or to avoid the real mind-body problem.

Though both Logical Positivism and Professor Boring's doctrine have certain behavioristic aspects, in fundamental theory they differ notably from what is commonly known as Behaviorism. For this latter school so far as it means to be purely methodological I have a certain sympathy—though it is hard for me to see how in the long last it can confine itself strictly to method. By its very nature it would seem to be bound to the assertion that consciousness is entirely and always inefficient. So far as this is the case, Behaviorism as a method is plainly committed to

the epiphenomenalism we have already considered. The more theoretical and more extreme branch of the school which explicitly identifies consciousness with the unconscious activities of muscles and glands is, with equal obviousness, a sub-case of that type of Materialism which asserts that mind is matter or matter in motion. As both of these forms of Materialism have been briefly considered already, I shall say nothing more of Behaviorism in this place. It is not really an attempt to show that the mind-body problem can be avoided, but a positive and very ancient proposal for its solution.

I am not certain whether the Gestalt psychologists should be classed among those who believe they have discovered a new way of avoiding, or evading, our problem; but at any rate they often speak as if they felt so. They reject Materialism because of its error in making matter more important than mind, and because meaning and significance, the spiritual and cultural values of mankind, are so real and fundamental that they cannot be explained by the merely physical.<sup>2</sup> But, in the opinion of the Gestalt school, Vitalism and "Spiritualism" are equally to be rejected.<sup>3</sup> What we need, they tell us, is a way of envisaging the problem that shall retain all the scientific values of Materialism, yet find as firm a place as Vitalism and Spiritualism do for all the mental values, and at the same time avoid the difficulties of either a materialist, parallelist, or interactionist theory. This consummation, so devoutly to be wished, is promised us by Gestalt.

This desirable way out of the mind-body problem is difficult to state. As presented by Koffka, in the most elaborate attempt yet made to expound the Gestalt view, it is so involved in figurative speech that to see exactly what is intended is not easy. But after one has, with many rereadings, translated "*molar*" and "*molecular*", "*behavioral*", and "*geographical*", into what they appear to mean, the position of the school seems to be something of this sort. Consciousness is recognized as real and is distinguished from the physical things that make up the "geographical" environment, from the body as such, and from the unconscious activities of the body. The behaviorist psychologists are criticized

<sup>2</sup> Koffka, *Principles of Gestalt Psychology* 12, 19-21.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* 12.

for their denial of consciousness and their refusal to make use of introspection. Nor are the body and its activities to be interpreted in any panpsychic or idealistic sense. But physiological activity is found to be not "molecular" but "molar". The meaning of this expression is that we must regard physiology not analytically but synoptically: the whole determines the part rather than the reverse; the concept of the "field" must be substituted for that of separate pushes and pulls. Physiological processes "are not a sum or combination of independent local nerve processes, but nervous processes in extension such that each local process depends on all the other local processes within the molar distribution".<sup>4</sup> In this, physiology is not peculiar: "physics also is a molar science".<sup>5</sup> The concept of the field dominates all the physical as well as all the behavioral world.

Further than this, there is a close relation between psychical and physiological processes—a fact to which Köhler and Koffka refer as "the principle of congruence or isomorphism".<sup>6</sup> By this principle is intended the fact that many of the relations of space, time, intensity, found in conscious processes may be paralleled by similar relations within "the underlying processes" or "physiological fundamentals". The general hypothesis of the Gestalt school is, in short, "that the concrete order of actual experience is a true representation of the dynamic order of corresponding physiological processes".<sup>7</sup>

From these considerations what follows? Let us admit with the Gestalt school that physiology and physics are both "molar" and that physiological and conscious processes are "isomorphic" in the sense explained. What light do these hypotheses throw upon the mind-body problem? I cannot see that they throw any. The old question as to the relation between the two processes still stares us in the face. Both Parallelism and Epiphenomenalism have always insisted upon isomorphism, and there is in the concept nothing incompatible with interaction. To be sure, the "physiological fundamentals", and "underlying processes", or (as Koffka calls them) the physiological "correlates of consciousness", are

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* 59.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.* 57.

<sup>6</sup> Koffka, *ibid.* 62; Köhler, *Gestalt Psy.* 61.

<sup>7</sup> Köhler 67.

not "purely physiological" because they "reveal themselves" in a "conscious aspect". But do not the epiphenomenalists say the same? Merely to assert that physiological processes are "molar" and that they express this in conscious aspects is to say nothing at all concerning the questions raised by the mind-body problem and to do nothing to avoid that problem save by talking of something else.

As a fact, Koffka does incidentally and inadvertently suggest a real solution to the problem. After having vehemently denied that his theory is purely physiological he adds the significant sentence: "True enough, this conscious side of the process does not enter into our causal explanations". This tell-tale sentence was really inevitable: for, had it been left out, the writer would have been untrue to the entire aim and presupposition of the Gestalt School. This aim is to explain behavior, and the presupposition is that all behavior is ultimately explicable only in the physiological processes that underlie consciousness. "Direct experience", writes Köhler, "is not a 'force' interfering with the chain of physical causation".<sup>8</sup> "In our *ultimate* explanations", writes Koffka, "we can have but one universe of discourse, and it must be the one about which physics has taught us so much."<sup>9</sup> Quotations might be multiplied from various Gestalt writers, but this is needless. The patent fact is that this school has no way of avoiding the mind-body problem, and that its solution is to be found in the regulation materialistic view, though "*mit ein bisschen andern Worten*". What becomes of the promise to free the spiritual and cultural values from determination by the merely material, is too patent to need comment.

One of the most recent and elaborate attempts to avoid any of the dualistic solutions of the mind-body problem is to be found in Professor Stout's Gifford Lectures on *Mind and Matter*. The attempt seems to me entirely unsuccessful. As I view it, Professor Stout's hypothesis draws what superficial persuasiveness it possesses from a confusion between the object or referend of a perceptive or ratiocinative process, and the cerebral correlate of that process—a confusion which, as we have seen, both Spinoza and several of the objective idealists have shared. Professor Stout

<sup>8</sup> *Op. cit.* 59.

<sup>9</sup> *Op. cit.* 48.



would avoid the dualistic problem by postulating that our *sensa* are part of a world-continuum, which is also inclusive of physical objects. Physical objects and our *sensa* are thus continuous with each other, "of a piece with each other". The distinction between them is based wholly upon the different ways in which they are known. Now it is plain, from a careful reading of the passage in which this argument appears, that the physical objects thus known by us and thus continuous with and "of a piece with" our *sensa*, are the physical objects of our perception, not the sections or activities of the brain and nervous system which are correlates of the *sensa*. The problem of the relation of these two, that is, the real mind-body problem, has thus been simply omitted in the proposed solution. And although, doubtless, brains and their activities would, on Professor Stout's hypothesis, also be parts of the world-continuum, the problem would still present itself for solution: What is the relation of these physical parts to those parts known as our conscious *sensa*? Even aside from this apparent misunderstanding of the problem, Professor Stout's position seems to me quite unpersuasive. It is possible that conscious impulse is somehow an aspect of all physical activity even in the inorganic world, as Professor Stout and the panpsychists assert; but I see no good reason for believing it. It is even more difficult to accept Professor Stout's view that *sensa* in some way logically imply body, and that our experience of "the embodied self" is an experience of *sensa* as aspects of the physical. It is very difficult for me even to conceive of this latter suggestion as meaningful; and I certainly can find no reason whatever for believing it to be true.

On an earlier page I pointed out that the majority of the thinkers who are unwilling to accept Interaction and unable to find comfort in Parallelism have tried one or another of the two obvious ways out of the difficulty. To the first of these ways—the attempt to avoid the mind-body problem altogether through some epistemological or monistic device—I have given as much consideration as the limits of this paper and of your long-suffering patience will justify. The other way of facing the problem—that is actually facing and not denying it—has been adopted by a considerable number of thinkers; it consists in a careful at-



tempt to resuscitate Materialism. It is interesting to note that most of these attempts have chosen that form of Materialism which identifies consciousness with brain or brain-activity. They have, that is, seen the futility of any doctrine that denies efficiency to consciousness, and have preferred the very daring task of finding an identity between what seem to be quite different and distinguishable things. Thus Durant Drake, who had formerly been a staunch defender of Idealistic Parallelism in its outright form, seems to have had much less confidence in it toward the close of his life, and in his latest work—his delightful *Invitation to Philosophy*—he mixes his Parallelism so inextricably with Materialism that it is hard to say where he should be classed. And the form of Materialism which he chooses is the assertion of the identity of mental activity with physical. The defense of Naturalism is ably conducted, but a careful and analytic reading of his chapters on mind and body will show a frequent alternation from Materialism to Parallelism and back again, as occasion demands. It is only because he is—perhaps unconsciously—supporting two mutually inconsistent hypotheses that he seems able to defend his position against the attacks of Interaction.

"Human mental life is . . . a set of elaborate, integrated impression-reaction nervous processes."<sup>10</sup> This was Drake's final position upon the mind-body problem—a position in no significant way different from that of Hobbes. Mr. Russell's identification of our ideas with the insides of our brains is even more obviously a repetition of Hobbes' view. A more recent writer proposes that "the mind is simply a wave-system of the brain as a whole". Another says "thought is a flow of particles through the cortex". Assertions of this sort, identifying consciousness with the brain or its activity, are increasingly common today. I cannot see that their modernity, or any discoveries of the last three hundred years, make them any more meaningful than they were in Hobbes' time; to me they are just as far as ever from making sense. I cannot conceive of a statement more obviously false than the assertion that thought is a flow of particles. I cannot imagine an intelligent discussion with a man who may at any moment thus change the meaning of his terms. For one who plays fast and loose with

<sup>10</sup> *Invitation to Philosophy* 388.

words in so omnipotent a fashion, all things would seem to be possible. If my experience of this white paper with inkmarks upon it, or my thought of the philosophic problem before us, may identically be a "flow of particles", then the flow of particles can perfectly well turn out to be a mountain in South Africa, and the mountain may be a new book by Bertrand Russell, or the beauty of a painting of El Greco. Consider what would happen in History or in Mathematics if our colleagues in those fields for a moment permitted so outrageous a use of terms. The assassination of Julius Caesar might "be" the price of cotton in 1861, and a right-angled triangle might "be" 47 to the ninth power. In a society where such misuse of language was indulged in, not only philosophical and scientific discussion, but ordinary conversation would be impossible. For the very first of the Aristotelian Laws of Thought—the Law of Identity—is violated by it. As Aristotle says, "not to have one meaning is to have no meaning"; and a man who does not see this, in the opinion of the Founder of Logic, "is seen already to be no better than a vegetable". Surely it is a disgrace to Philosophy that more than 2300 years after the death of Socrates it should still be necessary to labor this point.

Not all the defenders of Materialism in our day, however, are guilty of so outrageous a use of terms. For some of them I have great respect and admiration. As there is no time this evening for a *résumé* of all the recent restatements of Materialism, I shall confine my remarks to the one that seems to me the best and most nearly persuasive—that of Professor Sellars in the sixteenth chapter of his *Philosophy of Physical Realism*. There is one and only one physical object, according to Sellars, of which we are able to know not merely the structure and process, but also the inner quality: this object is what he calls the brain-mind. Its inner quality is consciousness. Consciousness is thus a quality of the brain. It is as completely identical with the cerebrum as are the physical qualities of that organ. We may say that the brain is painful, is joyful, is hesitant, in the same sense in which we may say that it is of a certain shape, size, and chemical constitution. If it be objected that there is a manifest repugnancy (as Berkeley would put it) in asserting that a given brain-state is painful, Professor Sellars, as I understand him, would reply that

the seeming contradiction is no greater, nor of a different nature, that the verbal contradiction involved in the unobjectionable statement that a given round object *is red*.

Everyone, I think, must admire the judicial frankness of Professor Sellars' treatment of this difficult problem and the ingenuity and subtlety of his suggestions. But further analysis is here desirable. The hypothesis that consciousness *is* a quality of the brain is tied up with the uncertainties and ambiguities that commonly attend an assertion of identity. The assertion, for example, that a given round object is red will, in the first place, be open to different interpretations according as we hold secondary qualities to be subjective or objective. As Professor Sellars believes these to be entirely subjective, let us first consider the meaning of our red circle on that basis. Two meanings may be given to the assertion and only two. By asserting that a circular object is red we may mean either that an object which is circular produces in us a red experience or *sensum*; or that a given object (shape not specified) produces in us *both* the experience of circularity and that of redness. Let us now revert to Professor Sellars' assertion of identity between the brain and the quality of painfulness. Plainly this may mean either that the brain is a substance and produces in us a painful *sensum*; or that a given object called brain produces in us both visual and tactual and also painful sensations. In either case we presuppose a sentient self to have the sensations; or, if we prefer the wording, we presuppose a stream of consciousness which is affected by the brain. In neither case, so far as I can see, have we done anything to avoid, solve, or throw light upon, the mind-body problem. We should, indeed, be attempting to solve the problem should we say that the essence *painfulness* is the essence *brain-structure and motion of particles*; but Professor Sellars is far too clearsighted to commit himself to anything so manifestly absurd.

The other view of secondary qualities is of course conceivable; and, though Professor Sellars rejects it, we may well consider its bearing upon our problem. If these qualities be objective, the brain doubtless possesses them as well as primary qualities: it is, in that case, soft, warm, grey, etc., etc. But does this really throw light upon our problem? Are the various characteristics of con-

sciousness—emotion, awareness of meaning, adoption of purpose, strenuous effort, reasoning—are these physical properties? Are they properly to be classed under the same category as color, taste, softness?

It seems to me that they are not. A secondary physical property is one thing; the awareness of that quality seems to me to belong in a quite different category. I can understand that grey might be one of the brain's qualities, whether seen or unseen; but the assertion that *awareness* of grey is one of the brain's qualities would be to me a meaningless statement, unless interpreted in the sense that the brain somehow produces the awareness of grey. It is conceivable that there is something essentially queer about the structure of my brain-mind, something which makes me constitutionally incapable of putting meaning into the asserted identity, something which compels me to believe that certain acts and states such as thinking, believing, feeling, striving, are psychological and not physical. In the long last, I suppose, for each of us, the crux of the mind-body problem comes down to the question: do I or do I not *mean* by thinking and feeling and willing anything which can qualify a physical object in the way in which primary and perhaps secondary qualities qualify it?

If, in the attempt to make the materialistic view less paradoxical and more persuasive, it be said that it is not the brain as a physical object, but the brain-mind, a newly-realized whole, that thinks and feels, in addition to possessing shape and size, then I can only say that this solution seems to me purely verbal, and that within this newly-conceived totality, the question of the relation between its mental and its physical parts or aspects or qualities will break out afresh, and we shall once more have upon our hands the old psycho-physical problem. Some of us are a trifle suspicious of this new term "brain-mind". It seems to be a word to conjure with; and some of us wonder if it be not a royal road to missing the point. In other words, it seems to me and to many others, that the recent attempts to resuscitate Materialism have run upon the same essential difficulty that made the old Materialism so hard to accept: the difficulty, namely, that we do not mean by consciousness what we mean by matter or by any of the qualities of matter.

After all I have said of a negative and critical sort, none of you will have any curiosity as to my own more positive opinion on the psycho-physical problem. You will not be curious because you must already know. Since I regard the problem as unavoidable, and since I cannot accept either the parallelist or the materialist solution, it is plain that I must adhere to some form of Interaction. And indeed I do. But I am convinced that we cannot stop with mere interaction between psychic states and physical states or entities; psychic states as such—a mere stream of inactive *sensa*, thoughts, and feelings—have not enough being and spontaneity of their own to account for the facts of human life. The evidence for Interaction drives me on to the acceptance of a real and active self. Epistemological considerations of a decisive sort point, in my opinion, to the same conclusion. Obviously it is out of the question, at this time in the evening, to go into a detailed consideration of the somewhat subtle questions which such a position naturally raises. It involves the conception of a decidedly complex universe in which there are different kinds of laws, a world which is full of a number of things, and in which everything is not like everything else. I can only say that to my thinking, the concept of such a complex world in which there are both physical and psychical realities, and which includes among its entities active and substantial selves which have become “organic to” their bodies, offers the only way out of the difficulties that we have been considering this evening—the only way of thinking about these matters which is meaningful and self-consistent, the only hypothesis that will fit in with all the facts and enable us to make sense of history, morality, and human life.

The mind-body problem has been discussed for two or three thousand years. It seems perennial. What is the reason for this? Why does it never get settled? Let me suggest a possible reply. Very briefly it is this. The problem has really one right answer, one answer which can justify itself in both *a priori* and *a posteriori* fashion. But this answer is fundamentally incompatible with the preconceived theory of Naturalism which has subtly dominated the thoughts of a large number of thinkers as an intellectual desideratum ever since the Renaissance. Its appeal as a final and monistic solution to all our problems is very strong. We should

like to get our questions answered by a single universal formula if we only could. Hence the will to believe in the efficacy of a naturalistic formula. We all, I am sure, have at times felt the appeal of such a simple and complete solution. The answer is so beautifully easy that we are loath to admit the complexity of our world. We should like it to be, in principle, as transparent as mathematics. We want it all alike, both in structure and in law, even if the facts on the one hand and the demands of our moral nature on the other point in a different direction. Particularly our colleagues in the field of psychology have heard the siren voice of Sweet Simplicity. Naturally they desire their subject to be *streng wissenschaftlich*; and to make it so they have been willing to pay the price of either denying the existence of consciousness or making it entirely inefficient. A few of them seem to have comforted themselves by adopting something like the Mediaeval doctrine of the Two Truths. Interaction and the reality and efficiency of spiritual activity, they have told themselves, might be false in psychology and true in philosophy. So they have comforted their intellectual consciences. But such comfort is poor comfort, for they as well as we really know that no such compromise is possible.

The psychologists are by no means the only ones who have accepted Naturalism not because of reason but in spite of reason. Such at any rate is my feeling. The call of a popular monistic formula that offers to be of universal application has so strong a social backing that no one can fail to hear it. But before we accept it we should search seriously our consciences and ask ourselves whether the desire to reject Interaction willy nilly, so prevalent in our days, be not really due to a socially approved taste and to the wish to defend a preconceived faith, rather than to any compulsory reasons or to a cold review of all the relevant considerations.

JAMES BISSETT PRATT

WILLIAMS COLLEGE

## PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION 1935

### NINTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF OFFICERS

#### *American Council of Learned Societies*

The sixteenth annual meeting of the Council was held in Boston, February 1 and 2, 1935, in the House of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. The eleventh annual conference of the secretaries of the Constituent Societies convened on January 31. The Association was represented by one delegate, Sterling P. Lamprecht, and by the Secretary of the Board of Officers who served as alternate in the absence of F. J. E. Woodbridge. Among the acts of the Council the following are of especial interest to the members of the Philosophical Association: it was voted to set apart \$2750.00 to assist in the preparation and publication of *Studies in Primitivism* by A. O. Lovejoy and associates at the Johns Hopkins University; \$5000.00 to Edward Sapir and associates at Yale University for preparation of a *Descriptive Grammar of English*; and \$1000.00 toward the cost of publication of John Wild's *George Berkeley*. The Constituent Societies were reminded of the available Rotograph service by which rare or unusual documents can be made available to members for research. Inquiries should be directed to our publication committee.

#### *Committees*

##### *Bibliography*

Emerson Buchanan reported to the committee as follows:

"Ultimately we expect to have entries for 100,000 works on philosophy. Of these, about 30,000 have been collected and about 9,000 classified. Since two or more cards have to be typed for each book or article, I might add that we shall ultimately require about 200,000 cards, and that of these we have now about 43,000, and have checked about 10,000 for accuracy of information.

"I expect that by next June we shall have cards for about 70,000 works, and that by December, 1936, we shall have one card for each of the 100,000 works, and a second card for each of the articles; and that almost all the works will have been classified. During the first half of 1937 we shall check all the cards for books and make a second card for each. We expect, therefore, to be ready for the press by June, 1937.

"Below is a more detailed statement of the work done:

"Two cards have been written for each of 6,000 articles, i.e. 12,000 cards. Of these, the cards for 5,000 articles, i.e. 10,000 cards, have been checked against the articles themselves, and the articles have been read and classified.

"We have cards for about 24,000 books. Of these, about 7,000 are Library of Congress cards and have a duplicate. We have then, about 31,000 book-cards. Of these, none have been checked. About 4,000 of the books have been classified.

"For the first year and a half the cards were written by hand. Now they



are typed, and hence done more rapidly. During the first two years, moreover, we had very little clerical assistance. This year we have an assistant paid from the funds to work 15 hours a week, and assistance from the National Youth Administration amounting to 114 hours a month."

For the Committee,

C. J. DUCASSE, *Chairman*

#### *Employment*

The work of the committee for the current year has been devoted entirely to the preparation of a symposium on the *Place and Importance of Philosophy in Education*. Contributions to the proposed symposium were received from seventeen persons. Its publication, however, was dependent on approval by the Board of Officers. This approval was withheld by vote of the Board.

For the Committee,

M. T. MCCLURE, *Chairman*

#### *International Congress of Philosophy*

A committee has been appointed to coöperate with the Ninth International Congress of Philosophy to be held in Paris from August 1 to 6, 1937. No other report is made at this time.

#### *Publication*

The following report from Gregory D. Walcott, the General Editor of the *Source Books in the History of the Sciences*, has been received by the Committee.

"In April, 1935, the *Source Book in Physics* by Professor W. F. Magie of Princeton University came from the press and already approximately 800 copies have been sold. The manuscript for the *Source Book in Geology* is being typed for the last time and will be in the hands of the publishers at an early date. The special editors of the remaining volumes have all reported progress for their respective tasks, but which will be the fifth on the market and when cannot be predicted at present."

Two applications were received during the year for grants in aid of publication offered by the American Council of Learned Societies. One of these, by Professor John Wild of Harvard, for aid in publishing a work on Berkeley, was approved by the Committee, and publication of the book is going forward under a grant by the Council.

No applications for aid in the duplication of rare manuscripts, such as appeared to come within the scope of this service offered by the Council, have as yet been received.

For the Committee,

E. A. BURTT, *Chairman*

#### FINANCIAL STATEMENT

Year ended December 31, 1935

*American Philosophical Association*

H. G. Townsend, *Secretary*

Eugene, Oregon



DEAR SIR:

Pursuant to your instructions I have examined the accounts and records of the American Philosophical Association for the year ended December 31, 1935, and submit herewith statements of cash receipts and disbursements of the several funds for the year ended that date.

Bank balances were verified by correspondence with depository banks. Receipts and disbursements were verified by examination of receipted bills or cancelled checks. All the information required was furnished.

I certify that the following statements of cash receipts and disbursements of the General Treasury Revolving Fund for Publication, Fund for the Eighth International Congress and the Bibliography Fund of the American Philosophical Association are, in my opinion, correct.

Respectfully submitted,

O. K. BURRELL,

Certified Public Accountant

	General Treasury	Fund for Revolving Publi- cation	Inter- national Congress of Philosophy	Biblio- graphy Fund
Balances, December 31, 1934.....	\$390.26	\$9,143.76	\$149.07	\$ 99.90
Receipts:				
Eastern Division .....	260.19			
Western Division .....	107.10			
Pacific Division .....	50.40			
Expense Refunds and Miscellaneous .....	6.58			
Royalties (McGraw Hill Co.).....		357.40		
Interest on Bank Deposit.....		150.86	3.53	
Sale of Volumes and Proceedings. ....	1.00		9.50	
Received from A.C.L.S.....				300.00
Total .....	\$815.53	\$9,652.02	\$162.10	\$ 399.90

## Disbursements:

A.C.L.S. Dues .....	\$ 25.00
Audit 1934 .....	10.00
Printing and Binding Vol. VIII, <i>Philosophical Review</i> , 675 copies .....	163.14
<i>Philosophical Review</i> , Republica- tion of Proceedings.....	75.99
Telephone and Telegraph.....	10.26
Stenographic and Clerical.....	11.75
Postage, Express and Stationery..	26.34
Repayment to Author of Royalties received in excess of cost, <i>Source Book in Mathematics</i> ....	107.46

Complimentary copies to contributors, <i>Source Book in Physics</i> ....	65.67			
Examination copies, <i>Source Book in Physics</i> .....	7.83			
Exchange .....	.30			
Council on Research in the Humanities of Columbia University, Philosophical Bibliography .....				399.90
Total Disbursements .....	\$322.48	\$ 181.26	\$.....	\$ 399.90
Balances, December 31, 1935.....	\$493.05	\$9,470.76	\$162.10	\$.....

## RECAPITULATION OF FUNDS

General Treasury (United States National Bank of Portland, Eugene Branch) .....	\$ 493.05
Revolving Fund for Publication (First National Bank of Portland, Oregon) .....	9,470.76
Fund for International Congress of Philosophy (First National Bank of Eugene, Oregon).....	162.10
Total, All Funds.....	<u>\$10,125.91</u>

The following members of the Carus Lecture Committee were elected by vote of the Board of Officers: G. P. Adams, G. W. Cunningham and C. J. Ducasse.

During the year the Chairman designated Morris R. Cohen and H. B. Smith to represent the Association at the annual meeting of the American Academy of Political and Social Science held in Philadelphia April 5 and 6, 1935. He also has made the following committee appointments:

*International Congress of Philosophy:* B. A. G. Fuller, A. O. Lovejoy, Glenn Morrow, A. E. Murphy, W. H. Sheldon, C. B. Vibbert, H. G. Townsend and W. P. Montague, *Chairman*.

*Publication:* Richard McKeon and G. S. Brett.

For the Board of Officers,

H. G. TOWNSEND, *Secretary*

## WESTERN DIVISION

*President:* E. T. Mitchell.

*Vice-President:* D. S. Robinson.

*Secretary-Treasurer:* A. C. Benjamin.

*Executive Committee:* The foregoing officers and Herbert Martin, C. D. W. Hildebrand, G. R. Morrow, Charles M. Perry.

The thirty-sixth annual meeting of the Western Division was held at Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri, on May 2, 3, and 4, 1935.

The following program was presented:

Harris and the St. Louis Movement in Philosophy.....Charles M. Perry

Harris and the Journal of Speculative Philosophy.....E. L. Schaub  
 Harris and Hindu Thought.....K. F. Leidecker  
 Addresses by President W. L. Bryan of Indiana University and Professor  
 G. R. Dodson of Washington University.

Symposium: Logical Analysis vs. Metaphysics.

Positivism, Not Negativism.....Herbert Feigl  
 Logical Analysis and Metaphysics.....D. F. Swenson  
 Philosophy of Science and Science of Philosophy.....C. W. Morris  
 Metaphysics for Positivists.....Charles Hartshorne  
 Toward Understanding and Milesians.....P. R. Anderson  
 Realism of Bosanquet and Watson.....L. P. Chambers  
 Beauty and Value.....D. W. Gotshalk  
 The Problem of Historical or Cultural Reality in Contemporary

Thought .....Bonno Tapper  
 Truth and the Interest-Theory of Value.....M. H. Moore  
 Modern Physics and the Law of Identity.....O. L. Reiser  
 Logical Space.....V. C. Aldrich  
 Presidential Address: The Tragic Realm of Truth.....T. V. Smith  
 Symposium: The Crisis of Liberalism.  
 Beyond Political Democracy.....J. L. Hudson  
 The False Principle of Liberalism.....E. Jordan  
 When Philosophers Are Kings.....Herbert Martin  
 Liberty in a Planned Society.....G. R. Morrow

The minutes of the preceding meeting were corrected as follows:  
 Proceedings, page 162, line 16, for the words "this arrangement", substitute the words "the Bibliography"; page 163, line 6, for the words "Philosophical Index", substitute the word "Bibliography".

The Executive Committee recommended that the Western Division meet at Iowa City in 1936. Recommendation adopted.

The Executive Committee recommended the expenditure of seventy-five dollars (\$75.00), to be paid to the Open Court Publishing Company for the printing and distribution of such copies of the proposed volume on W. T. Harris as the fund will permit. Such copies will be furnished at wholesale prices. The cost of distribution is to be borne by the Open Court Publishing Company, and the mailing list, to be furnished by the Association, will consist of such libraries in this country and abroad as would not reasonably be expected to buy them. Recommendation adopted.

The Executive Committee recommended the following candidates for admission to membership: E. W. Balduf, M. S. Everett, P. S. Goertz, H. P. Jordan, W. A. R. Leys, B. E. Meland, W. A. Mulherin, C. P. Osborne. Recommendation adopted.

Professor Robinson reported briefly for the Committee on Bibliography.

Professor Robinson reported for the Committee on Harris, outlining the proposal to publish the papers on Harris, and requesting the continuation of the committee for the completion of this task. Report adopted.

On motion by Professor Schaub, the Secretary was to be authorized to present two proposals to Professor Vibbert with reference to the publication of the presidential address, the presentation of which was made im-

possible by illness. The address either should be included in the Proceedings and Addresses for 1935, along with the address of the vice-president, or should be included in the Proceedings and Addresses for 1936, along with the presidential address of that year. In the latter case Professor Vibbert should be invited to give the address at the Annual Smoker in 1936. Motion adopted.

On motion by Professor Schaub, the Secretary was authorized to write a letter of congratulation to Professor Leighton on the completion of twenty-five years as teacher and head of the department of philosophy at Ohio State University. This letter was to be sent to Professor A. R. Chandler, with instructions to have it read on the occasion of the banquet in honor of Professor Leighton on May 11th. Motion adopted.

Professor Morris made a brief announcement with reference to the Congress on the Unity of the Sciences, to be held in Paris, September 15-23, 1935.

On motion by Professor Avey a vote of thanks was extended to Washington University for its hospitality and for the excellent arrangements for the meeting.

The following report of the treasurer was adopted:

*Receipts*

Balance, on hand April 26, 1934.....	\$467.45
Annual dues .....	289.81
Interest .....	.63
	<hr/>
	\$757.89

*Disbursements*

A.P.A. Treasury

Membership @ 25c.....	\$42.75
Proceedings .....	68.25
	<hr/>
	110.00
Indiana Meeting .....	14.74
Stationery and supplies .....	23.95
Postage, bank charges, express.....	36.33
Stenographic services .....	17.58
Programs .....	14.03
	<hr/>
	\$217.63
Balance, May 3, 1935.....	540.26
	<hr/>
	\$757.89

A. C. BENJAMIN, *Secretary*

## EASTERN DIVISION

*President:* Edgar S. Brightman.

*Vice-President:* George H. Sabine.

*Secretary-Treasurer:* Arthur E. Murphy.

*Executive Committee:* The foregoing officers and R. M. Blake (1936), Percy Hughes (1936), Katherine E. Gilbert (1937), D. W. Prall (1937), Raphael Demos (1938), Horace L. Friess (1938), James Bissett Pratt *ex officio* for one year.

The thirty-fifth annual meeting was held at the Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland, December 29-31, 1935. The following program was presented:

Pareto and the Temperamental Interpretation of History.....	Harold A. Larrabee
Philosophy of Life and Philosophy of History.....	Richard Kroner
Philosophy of History.....	Sterling P. Lamprecht
What is a Class? .....	Owen N. Hillman
Are Some Propositions Neither True Nor False?.....	Charles A. Baylis
Propositions About Space-Time.....	A. Ushenko
Symposium: Implications for Philosophy of the Theory of Probability..	
.....	Morris R. Cohen, F. S. C. Northrop, William Savery
Symposium: The Philosophy of Plato	
Poetry and Truth in Plato.....	Irwin Edman
Philosophical Method According to <i>Republic</i> and <i>Phaedo</i> .....	
.....	Richard Robinson
The Philosophical Economy of the Theory of Ideas....	Harold Cherniss
Plato's Idea of the Good.....	Raphael Demos
Presidential Address: The Present Status of the Mind-Body Problem..	
.....	James B. Pratt
The Concept of Cause in History.....	James Burnham
Testability and Meaning.....	R. Carnap
An Examination of Logical Positivism.....	Arthur O. Lovejoy

The business meeting was held on Tuesday, December 31, at 12:45 p.m., President Pratt presiding. The minutes of the thirty-fourth annual meeting were approved as printed.

## TREASURER'S REPORT

*Receipts*

Balance brought forward.....	\$2,487.92
Membership dues .....	735.10
Interest .....	40.13

*Total* ..... \$3,263.15

*Expenditures*

A.P.A. Treasury .....	\$ 103.25
Printing of Annual Report.....	156.94
Expenses of Annual Meeting.....	69.09
Printing, mailing of abstracts.....	18.00

Printing, mailing of announcements, programs, etc....	39.00
Secretarial Assistance .....	27.00
<i>Total</i> .....	413.28
<i>Balance on hand</i> .....	\$2,849.87
Audited and found correct: RALPH M. BLAKE CORNELIUS KRUSÉ <i>Auditors</i>	

The present status of the employment service maintained by the Division and that of the national committee on opportunities for employment in philosophy were discussed. It was voted, on recommendation of the executive committee, that the Secretary communicate to the appropriate officers of the American Association of University Professors the conviction of this Division that University appointments are a matter of public interest and should be so managed that all qualified candidates have an opportunity to apply for available positions.

It was reported that a sum of from \$700 to \$800, in addition to what the American Council of Learned Societies and the Humanities Council of Columbia University could be depended on to supply, would be required to complete the work planned for the year on the Bibliography of Philosophy. It was voted that the Treasurer be instructed to pay out of the funds of the Division a *pro rata* share of such residual cost for this work, provided that the other Divisions of the Association take similar action.

The amendment to Article II, Sec. 3, of the constitution of the Division, proposed at the last regular business meeting, was adopted: To add the words "Active members of thirty years' good and regular standing, who are no longer actively engaged in teaching, are automatically relieved of further payment of dues". The Secretary announced that he had been authorized by the executive committee to interpret "teaching" in this connection as "full-time academic work".

Professor Lovejoy proposed a constitutional amendment substituting for the present provision for nomination of officers (Article III, Sec. 3) the following: "The President shall each year appoint a committee to nominate officers for the succeeding year." Under the rules, this proposal will be voted on at the next annual business meeting.

The nominating committee (A. O. Lovejoy, chairman, H. B. Alexander, and R. B. Perry) presented the following nominees: for President, Edgar S. Brightman; for Vice-President, George H. Sabine; for Secretary-Treasurer, Arthur E. Murphy; for new members of the Executive Committee for three years, Raphael Demos and Horace L. Friess. All were unanimously elected.

A memorial minute for A. C. Armstrong was read by Cornelius Krusé and one for James Haughton Woods by W. E. Hocking. Memorials prepared for James Mackaye, by W. K. Wright, and for E. Hershey Sneath, by D. C. Macintosh, were read by the Secretary. It was voted that all these be printed in the Annual Proceedings, at the expense of the Division, and they are accordingly included here.

In the death of Professor Andrew Campbell Armstrong, which occurred on February 22, 1935, the Philosophical Association lost one of its founding members and former presidents (1915) who from its inception until his end, devoted himself wholeheartedly with quiet but persistent zeal to the furtherance of the interests and usefulness of the Association both here and abroad.

Believing as he did that it was an important part of the mission of philosophy to "deepen the sense of solidarity" among philosophers of all races and countries, he spent over a period of thirty years a large share of his time and energy in furthering the contacts of this Association with similar organizations abroad. As early as 1904 he was chairman of the section of metaphysics at the brilliant International Congress of Arts and Sciences held in St. Louis. From 1916 until 1927 he was chairman of the Association's committee on International Co-operation. Through his sensitive tact, infinite patience, and ambassadorial skill, he helped substantially in rebuilding after the war many of the bridges to intellectual international coöperation which the war had rudely shattered. In recognition of his distinguished services he was honored with the Honorary Secretaryship of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy. As a member of the Permanent International Committee and continuing Honorary Secretary of the American committee since 1926, his experienced judgment and tact were again of great usefulness in the planning of the two subsequent international congresses.

As a worker in the field of philosophy his primary interest was in the historical approach to its problems, as was evidenced in his translation (1893) and later contributions to Richard Falckenberg's *History of Modern Philosophy*, in his authorship of *Transitional Eras in Thought* (1904), and in his contributions on historical subjects in philosophical journals. Historical studies, however, were not ends in themselves for him, but became primarily means of orientation in the turbulence of modern life. They imparted to him an enviable serenity and a poise in emancipating him from the tyranny of the past as well as from the sometimes too strident present.

To all those who had the privilege of knowing Professor Armstrong his distinguished personality with its innate courtesy, its devotion to the life of reason, and its clear-eyed idealism, remains a precious memory of what a life devoted to philosophy may mean. (Cornelius F. Krusé)

James Haughton Woods was a man of unusual range in his interests and of unusual erudition. At the time of his death in Tokyo, in January of this year, he was engaged in the study of certain rare manuscripts in Tendai Buddhism which had been left to his care by his friend, William S. Bigelow. He left almost ready for publication a translation of the Visuddhi-magga, an important Sinhalese source for southern Buddhism. He had some knowledge of at least fifteen languages, chiefly tools for the pursuit of his enquiries into Oriental philosophy, especially in the baffling region of the early transformations of the northern Buddhism into the forms which it assumed in Tibet and China. He spent two years in India, and visited China and Japan in 1929 in the interest both of perfecting his knowledge of the languages and of the Harvard-Yenching Institute, of which he was a trustee.

These activities in Oriental research all grew naturally from an early devotion to Greek philosophy, where numerous hints of connection with Indian thought excited his interest. He had been a student of theology, history and philosophy; had taken his first degree in philosophy at Harvard ('87) and his doctorate at Strassburg in 1896 under Windelband, writing a thesis on *Erkenntnistheorie und Causalität*; had continued his graduate studies at Harvard, working with

lanman in Sanscrit; and had become an instructor at Harvard in anthropology and philosophy; when in 1902 he resolved to specialize in Indian philosophy, and began studies with Deussen at Kiel which determined the line of his subsequent researches. All his publications thereafter were in this field, the main ones thus far appearing being *The Yoga System of Patanjali*, a translation of the *Mani-Prabha*, and an edition for the Pali Text Society of a part of the *Papañcasūdanī*, a commentary on the Majjima Nikāya.

Woods served Harvard as instructor and professor in the department of philosophy from 1903 to 1934, when he retired as professor emeritus. During this time he was for thirteen years chairman of the department, and served twice as exchange professor at the Sorbonne.

While Woods's temperament took him into the most difficult paths of historical scholarship, and filled his mind with the puzzles of dark periods of the development of ideas in Asia, this remote occupation paid back directly into his work as a teacher. Here he was an original expositor, and the freshness of his discussion was such as can only come from the perpetual breaking up of conventional derivations, and a vivid reliving of the sequences of thought with which he was dealing. It was a quickening event in any student's life to hear him expound the later dialogues of Plato, or interpret the phases of Indian religion and philosophy in their connection with social institutions and changes. He was not eloquent in any usual sense; he was rather hesitating in speech, and with a certain engaging awkwardness of gesture; but he was evidently a master, and a lover of reflection for whom every subject had endlessly opening horizons.

His professional friendships were chiefly in the fields of his own special studies; but his warm personal interest in those about him, his quiet, effective care for students and colleagues, and his generous devotion of energy to the incidental responsibilities of academic life, have left us all in his debt. For he has been among the first to further studies in mediaeval philosophy in this country; and it is largely due to him that it has been possible to publish the six volumes of the papers of Charles Peirce. He shunned publicity; but the fruits of his labors are manifold and enduring. (William Ernest Hocking)

The American Philosophical Association has met a serious loss in the death of James MacKaye. He was a unique figure among American philosophers. Although his interest in philosophy was early awakened as an undergraduate at Harvard by the teaching of James and Royce, his profession for thirty years was that of a research engineer. However, the practise of this profession forced social and moral problems upon his attention. He turned to the study of ethics, and published a series of books, of which *The Economy of Happiness*, *Americanized Socialism*, and *The Logic of Conduct*, are best known. In these he reformulated traditional Utilitarianism, and made it a workable method for the solution of the moral problems of our own times. Members of this division will recall the paper which he read at the meeting at Columbia University in December, 1929, in which he first made public his new theory of the universe, in opposition to Einstein and others. MacKaye's interpretation at once attracted wide attention, and he later expanded it in *The Dynamic Universe*. As a professor of philosophy at Dartmouth College he was a stimulating teacher, and made many enthusiastic converts among his students, some of whom are now teachers of philosophy and the social sciences. He was a lover of the New England countryside and an interpreter of Thoreau. His colleagues remember him as a true friend, a wise counsellor, a rigorous and consistent thinker, a well balanced reformer, and a brave, kind and lovable man. (W. K. Wright)



The members of the Eastern Division learn with deep regret of the death of E. Hershey Sneath, Ph.D., LL.D., Litt.D., Professor Emeritus of the Philosophy of Religion and Religious Education in Yale University.

A graduate of Lebanon Valley College and of the Divinity and Graduate Schools of Yale University, Dr. Sneath began his teaching career in philosophy at Yale in 1889. In 1898 he became Professor of Philosophy, serving as a colleague of the late Professors Ladd and Duncan. From 1912 until his retirement in 1923 he occupied the chair of Philosophy of Religion and Religious Education. Among his published works are: *The Philosophy of Reid*; *The Ethics of Hobbes*; *The Mind of Tennyson*; *Philosophy in Poetry*; and *Wordsworth, Poet of Nature and Man*.

In addition to his activities as teacher and author he did a vast amount of editorial work; and was mainly responsible for the production of some sixty-five volumes in his chosen fields of philosophy, ethics, religion, and religious education.

Deeply influenced by the idealistic philosophy of Lotze and Ladd, clear, methodical, and facile as a lecturer, he was regarded with genuine affection by his colleagues and pupils of earlier and later years. (Douglas C. Macintosh)

It was voted that the President appoint a committee to prepare a minute in honor of the hundredth anniversary of the birth of Wm. T. Harris.

On recommendation of the executive committee it was voted to continue for the year the liberal interpretation of membership requirements formulated in 1933. The following were elected:

*Active Members:* John S. Adams, Jr., William Wallace Bancroft, R. Lloyd Beck, Peter A. Bertocci, Dorion Cairns, Haskell B. Curry, William Edward Fort, Jr., Francis S. Haserot, Richard Hocking, Victor Lowe, William O. Martin, Frederick W. Meier, David Mitrany, Jannette E. Newhall, Robert Leet Patterson, Willard Van O. Quine, Gertrude V. B. Rich, E. Rosenstack-Huessy, Wilbur S. Sheriff, Robert G. Stephens, Dorothy Walsh.

*Associate members:* Daniel Joseph Bowden, A. Druckmann, Charles William Havice, Albert William Levi, Horace J. Nickels, Edward Carroll Sibley.

It was voted that the determination of the place of meeting for the next annual meeting be referred to the executive committee with power to act.

Professor H. B. Smith reported that the publication of the pamphlet prepared by the Employment Committee on the place and value of philosophy had been vetoed by the Board of Officers and questioned the authority of the Board in this matter, so far as the Eastern Division is concerned. No action was taken.

A motion instructing the Secretary to arrange for discussion of each paper (other than symposia) presented at the annual meeting, by an invited speaker who had read the paper in question prior to its presentation, was defeated.

A unanimous vote of thanks was tendered to the philosophy department of the Johns Hopkins University for its hospitality.

ARTHUR E. MURPHY, *Secretary-Treasurer*

## PACIFIC DIVISION

*President:* H. G. Townsend.

*Vice-President:* H. L. Searles

*Secretary-Treasurer:* Everett W. Hall.

*Executive Committee:* The foregoing officers and Stephen C. Pepper *ex officio* for one year, B. A. G. Fuller (1936), Everett J. Nelson (1937), W. R. Dennes (1937).

The twelfth annual meeting was held at Stanford University, December 26, 27, 28, 1935. The following program was presented:

What a Linguistic Contextualist Thinks of Philosophers.....	E. H. Lewis
Of What Use Is Metaphysics?.....	Everett W. Hall
The Political Philosophy of Hegel in a Frontier Society.....	H. G. Townsend
Linguistic Morphology in Relation to Thinking.....	Hubert G. Alexander
The Inductive Argument for an External World.....	Everett J. Nelson
The Realistic Analysis of Meaning.....	Donald C. Williams
The Problem of Meaning.....	W. R. Dennes
On Desire.....	Otis Lee
Plotinus on Emanation and Redemption.....	B. A. G. Fuller
The Metaphysics of Gossip.....	Henry Lanz
The Presidential Address—The Reasonable Limits of Skepticism.....	Stephen C. Pepper
The Form of History.....	Hugh Miller
Empiricism and Deductive Metaphysics.....	Frederick Anderson

The business meeting was held on December 28 at 9:30 a.m. The minutes of the 1934 meeting were approved as printed, with the correction that a record of the election of Everett W. Hall to the office of secretary-treasurer of the Division for a term of three years be inserted.

The Treasurer's report was presented and approved:

*Receipts*

Balance on hand January 1, 1935.....	\$290.28
Dues .....	148.00
Total .....	\$438.28

*Expenditures*

A.P.A. Treasury .....	\$ 50.40
Smoker (1934) .....	6.00
Postage .....	11.39
Clerical help .....	8.75
Committee on Employment (1934).....	2.91
Printing and mimeographing.....	8.65
Miscellaneous .....	1.23
Total .....	89.33

Balance on hand December 26, 1935.....	\$348.95
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Examined and found correct, HAROLD CHAPMAN BROWN

It was voted to accept the invitation to meet at Mills College next year.

The following were elected to active membership: Kurt F. Reinhardt, Paul R. Helsel, Isabel Creed; and the following were elected to associate membership: Barnett Savery, Clarence Reidenbach.

The following officers were elected: President, H. G. Townsend; Vice-president, H. L. Searles; members of the Executive Committee (two years), Everett J. Nelson and W. R. Dennes.

A motion that the thanks of the Pacific Division be extended to the Department of Philosophy of Stanford University for their hospitality in entertaining the Division was unanimously carried.

EVERETT W. HALL, *Secretary-Treasurer*

# OFFICERS AND COMMITTEES OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR 1936

(Addresses are given in the list of members. A date following a name indicates that the individual's tenure expires by limitation at the close of the calendar year mentioned.)

## Board of Officers:

E. T. Mitchell, *Chairman* (1936), H. G. Townsend, Edgar S. Brightman, E. W. Hall, A. C. Benjamin, Arthur E. Murphy, *Secretary* (1938).

## Delegates to the American Council of Learned Societies:

F. J. E. Woodbridge (1936), Sterling P. Lamprecht (1938).

## Committees:

### Bibliography—

C. J. Ducasse, *Chairman*, D. S. Robinson, D. W. Prall.

### Carus Lectures—

E. L. Schaub, *Chairman*, H. B. Alexander, Mary Hegeler Carus, C. I. Lewis (1937), E. B. McGilvary (1937), R. A. Tsanoff (1937), G. P. Adams (1939), C. J. Ducasse (1939), G. W. Cunningham (1939).

### International Congress of Philosophy—

W. P. Montague, *Chairman*, B. A. G. Fuller, A. O. Lovejoy, Glenn R. Morrow, A. E. Murphy, W. H. Sheldon, H. G. Townsend, C. B. Vibbert.

### Publication—

E. A. Burt, *Chairman* (1937), Richard McKeon (1936), W. K. Wright (1939), G. P. Adams (1938), G. S. Brett (1940).

## LIST OF MEMBERS

- Adams, Prof. George P., University of California, Berkeley, Calif.  
 Adams, Dr. John Stokes, Jr., University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa.  
 Aikens, Prof. H. Austin, Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio.  
 Aldrich, Dr. Virgil C., The Rice Institute, Houston, Tex.  
 Alexander, Prof. H. B., Scripps College, Claremont, Calif.  
 Alles, Prof. Adam, St. Johns College, Annapolis, Md.  
 Ames, Prof. E. S., University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.  
 Ames, Prof. Van Meter, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio.  
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 Bakewell, Prof. C. M., Yale University, New Haven, Conn.  
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 Baldwin, Prof. Robert C., Connecticut State College, Storrs, Conn.  
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 Baxter, Dr. Clayton A., Mount Allison University, Sackville, N.B., Can.  
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 Beck, Dr. R. Lloyd, Marshall College, Huntington, W.Va.  
 Becker, Prof. Frank C., Lehigh University, Bethlehem, Pa.  
 Benham, Mr. A. R., University of Washington, Seattle, Wash.  
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 Cattell, Dr. J. McKeen, Garrison-on-Hudson, N.Y.  
 Chambers, Prof. L. P., Washington University, St. Louis, Mo.  
 Chandler, Prof. Albert R., Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio.  
 Chanter, Prof. William G., Wesleyan University, Middletown, Conn.  
 Chao, Dr. Yuen Ren, National Research Institute of History and Philology, Peiping, China.  
 Chapman, Dr. Frank M., Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.  
 Chapman, Prof. Harmon M., New York University, University Heights, New York City.  
 Chidsey, Prof. Harold R., Lafayette College, Easton, Pa.  
 Christ, Dr. Paul S., Liberty High School, Bethlehem, Pa.  
 Church, Prof. Ralph W., Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y.  
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 Clark, Mr. John, Carleton College, Northfield, Minn.  
 Clark, Prof. Mary E., Smith College, Northampton, Mass.

- Clarke, Prof. Francis P., University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa.  
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 Everett, Prof. Walter G., Brown University, Providence, R.I.
- Farber, Prof. Marvin, University of Buffalo, Buffalo, N.Y.  
 Farley, Prof. J. H., Lawrence College, Appleton, Wis.  
 Feigl, Prof. Herbert, University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa.  
 Fenlon, Dr. Edward I., Brooklyn College, Brooklyn, N.Y.  
 Ferm, Prof. Vergilius, College of Wooster, Wooster, Ohio.  
 Fisch, Prof. M. H., Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio.  
 Fisher, Dr. Donald Warren, Stevens Institute of Technology, Hoboken, N.J.  
 Fitch, Dr. Frederic B., University of Virginia, University, Va.  
 Fitch, Prof. Robert E., Pacific University, Forest Grove, Ore.  
 Fite, Prof. Warner, Hopewell, N.J.  
 Fletcher, Prof. O. O., Furman University, Greenville, S.C.  
 Flewelling, Prof. Ralph T., University of Southern California, Los Angeles, Calif.  
 Flory, Dr. Paul M., 7701 15th Ave. N.E., Seattle, Wash.  
 Fort, Prof. William Edwards, Mercer University, Macon, Ga.  
 Fries, Dr. Horace S., University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis.  
 Friess, Prof. Horace L., Columbia University, New York City.  
 Frye, Prof. A. Myrton, Dartmouth College, Hanover, N.H.  
 Fuller, Prof. B. A. G., University of Southern California, Los Angeles, Calif.  
 Fulton, Dr. James S., McGill University, Montreal, Can.
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